Monday, 13 June 2022

Why study economics? Wizards of the Coast edition...

Have you ever wondered what happens in the labour market for wizards' henchmen when an evil wizard is defeated? Or stayed up a night worrying about inflation caused by adventurers looting dragon hoards then returning to the city with their newly-acquired riches? Have I got the job for you! Wizards of the Coast is hiring:

At Wizards of the Coast, we connect people around the world through play and imagination. From our genre defining games like Magic: The Gathering® and Dungeons & Dragons® to our growing multiverse, we continue to innovate and build new ways to foster friendship and connection. That’s where you come in!

Magic: The Gathering is a card game played and collected across the globe, with a wide-ranging assortment of products designed to engage a wide range of ways people enjoy playing Magic. As a Sr. Design Economist, you will help us better understand how Magic is played and purchased to help us make better, faster strategic decisions.

What You'll Do:

  • Learn from the Past: Study the data and trends to discover insights, new perspectives, and opportunities to improve how we serve different types of customers and markets.

  • Live in the Moment: Track and report on sales, identify market channels that are over/underperforming, and refine our projections and strategies in real time.

  • Predict the Future: Project product sales to inform print runs and market allocation for products we have made for decades, and to inform design of products we’ve never made before.

  • Boost our Agility: Help us adapt faster to changes in market conditions or behavior.\

  • Make our Party Smarter: Work with our design and sales teams to identify key holes in our understanding, conduct impactful studies, and communicate actionable insights. 

Ok, the successful applicant won't exactly be solving economic policy issues in fantasy worlds. But still, this is no doubt going to be a dream job for someone. And, let's face it, could there be a cooler application of economics than to gaming? This illustrates the underappreciated breadth of jobs that studying economics sets students up for (with many more in the associated links below).

[HT: Marginal Revolution]

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Sunday, 12 June 2022

Book review: Mission Economy

The world is simultaneously facing many challenges - climate change, inequality, population ageing, persistent gender gaps, the digital divide, transition to green energy, pandemic disease, and more. How are governments to best deal with these problems? In her recent book, Mission Economy, Mariana Mazzucato offers her view on a framework for developing solutions to society's wicked problems. Mazzucato, a professor in the Economics of Innovation and Public Value at University College London, argues for a mission-oriented approach. The exemplar that Mazzucato uses is the Apollo program which, in less than a decade, successfully launched astronauts to the moon and brought them back safely. Apollo focused resources on a single measurable goal, aligning public and private organisations towards a common goal.

I have a lot of sympathy for Mazzucato's proposal. On the whole, governments and the private sector are consistently failing to adequately tackle the modern world's key problems. It may require a radical readjustment in the overall approach, and that is what Mazzucato is offering. In the concluding section of the book, she offers seven key pillars for a new political economy to guide the mission-oriented approach:

  1. A new approach to value, with business, government, and civil society creating value together;
  2. A different framing of policy related to markets, moving from fixing market failures to actively co-creating and co-shaping markets;
  3. Organisational change, particularly for governments to reduce outsourcing and to share risk with the private sector;
  4. A change in the way that budgets and public financing are considered, moving from the economy serving finance, to finance serving the economy;
  5. Distribution and inclusive growth, focusing on predistribution and not just redistribution;
  6. A greater focus on partnership and stakeholder value; and
  7. Participation in the creation process, through a revival of debate, discussion, and consensus-building.

There is a lot that is arguable in the discussion of those pillars, but also a lot to like about the overall vision. However, despite the attractiveness of the ideas Mazzucato forwards in this book, there are several key problems that I felt were not adequately addressed. The first problem is how missions are chosen. Mazzucato devotes a fair amount of attention to this point, but her solution, based on democratic institutions, discussion, and consensus-building to me ignores the problems inherent in such an approach. The Apollo program worked well, but it was a mission that was chosen by President Kennedy in a top-down fashion. If, as Mazzucato contends, we are to build missions from the ground up, how are we to contend with competing preferences. Arrow's Impossibility Theorem reigns here. A system that results in multiple different concurrent missions simply risks competition for the same resources. Mazzucato refers to the Sustainable Development Goals, but there are 17 of them (with 169 targets) - this is the same problem that faces the 'beyond GDP' agenda (as I noted in my recent reviews of Measuring What Counts and For Good Measure, here and here). The Apollo program worked because there was a single mission to focus on, not 17 competing (albeit somewhat complementary) missions. The democratic approach to choosing a mission is also fraught, likely to lead to missions that suit the majority and ignore or pay minimal lip service to minority preferences. Mazzucato makes reference to Gil Scott-Heron's poem "Whitey on the Moon" (a stinging critique of the focus on the Apollo programme, while many of society's problems, and especially those relevant to African Americans, remained unsolved). However, Mazzucato's book lacks the necessary reflection that the mission-oriented approach needs to find some way to avoid the same problems that Scott-Heron refers to.

Mazzucato provides a critique of capitalism in her book, and argues that we need something better. However, the best mission-oriented economies are command economies. If you want to radically change economic and political institutions, or build infrastructure with minimal delays, having a completely centralised economy is one way to achieve it.

Second, and relatedly, the Apollo program worked well when there was one true source of information. The government could effectively control the narrative, and didn't have to worry too much about sniping from the sidelines. When social media gives everyone a platform to openly critique the government, it is difficult to maintain a focus on a single project, especially where there is always a chance that something is not going perfectly to plan. We've actually seen this in action in a way that is far too close for comfort. You could argue that New Zealand's response to the pandemic was mission-oriented. The mission was to eliminate the virus and prevent COVID-related deaths. Society was mostly on board with this mission, but not everyone. And every time that some part or other of the mission wasn't working perfectly, everyone was a critic. It would be even worse in a more politically polarised country than New Zealand. Mazzucato doesn't engage with this problem at all. It's not clear that she would want to, since 'controlling the narrative' in the modern sense is a tool employed by the most controlling autocratic regimes.

Finally, and potentially the biggest problem, is that there is a very real difference between a mission that is solving what is almost entirely an engineering, physics, and mathematics problem, and a mission that is trying to solve a human problem. To be fair, Mazzucato is aware of this point, writing that:

All this brings us back to the point that social missions are harder to fulfil than purely technological ones because they combine political, regulatory and behavioural changes.

That may be the understatement that defines this book. People are not simply chess pieces to be moved on a societal board. They have their own motivations and desires. Even if you can align them with a single goal in mind, people don't always do what you want. Solving human problems is hard. If it was easy, we would have done it already. If it was as easy as solving an engineering problem, then the most successful countries would be run by engineers. And excluding China (Xi Jinping trained as a chemical engineer), they're not.

The world has changed since the Apollo program was run. Small problems can quickly derail any large programme or initiative. Mazzucato refers to the Apollo I disaster in 1967, where three astronauts were burned alive during a dry run (they weren't even going to space yet at that stage). After six months of review, the programme was back on track. Contrast that with the Challenger and Columbia shuttle disasters, both of which grounded the space shuttles for two and a half years (and after Columbia, the programme was soon shut down). Serious mistakes early in a programme are likely to see the programme shut down. That makes the people in authority more risk averse, which is contrary to a radical, mission-oriented approach.

Having a mission-oriented economy is a bold vision, and an attractive one. We could start today. Some countries and governments have already started. But before we get too far, we're going to have to tackle with the fundamental problems that a mission-oriented approach will face. I liked this book, and it made me think. I do recommend it, but as a starting point for thinking about how we can do things better.

Saturday, 11 June 2022

The value of market power in alcohol sales

As Reason reported this week, Massachusetts is looking at revising its alcohol sales restrictions. The current regime is interesting because:

Massachusetts restricts license availability in two ways: creating quotas on how many licenses are available based on an area's population and restricting the number of licenses a single entity can own. While some other states have population quotas or quantity caps, very few have both of these restrictions in place at the same time.

Population quotas for alcohol retailing licenses ensure that only one license can be granted per several thousand residents in a municipality, based on a formula laid out in state law. There is a quota in place for both on-premise establishments like restaurants, as well as off-premise sellers like grocery and liquor stores.

The result of this limitation is that if a certain region has already met its quota for licenses, then any new retailers hoping to open up are barred from obtaining a license. If an alcohol seller goes out of business, however, that old license can become available on the so-called secondary market.

Since these secondary licenses are often the only chance for a new business to gain the right to sell alcohol, they have become immensely expensive in certain parts of the state. In Boston, bar liquor licenses have sold for north of $450,000. In states where population quotas do not exist, licenses can cost less than $100, underscoring the extent to which Massachusetts unnecessarily saddles its businesses with prohibitive startup costs.

If the government restricts the number of alcohol licences, then this restricts competition in the market for alcohol, and creates some market power for the holders of licences. As you can see in this 2018 post, this would lead to the price of alcohol being higher, but more importantly, the profits of sellers would be higher with the restrictions than if there was more competition. That's why a bar licence in Boston can sell for $450,000, when in other states a similar licence sells for less than $100. The prospective bar owner is willing to pay a premium for the licence, because they know that it grants them market power. They can recoup the cost of the licence through their higher future profits, generated by that market power. The value of that market power is measured by the premium paid for the licence.

Now, if the Massachusetts state government was smart, and wanted to maximise the profits they generate from the sale of alcohol licences, they would require that licences are surrendered to the state when a seller goes out of business. The licence could then be auctioned to the highest bidder. This way, the government would be able to extract nearly all of the monopoly profits from the buyer of the licence, because in theory that is the most that the buyer would be willing to pay for the licence. That the Massachusetts state government doesn't do that, and that licences are instead sold on a secondary market, is interesting in itself.

Also interesting, but not surprising, is that licence holders prefer the current regulations, over an alternative that would increase competition. An industry group represented licence holders has even gone so far as to offer a proposal that:

...cleverly packages a decrease in the most valuable type of license as an increase. Worse yet, the proposal does nothing to address the state's quota restrictions. This means that the overall pool of alcohol licenses would not increase, further condemning the state to its current restrictive system.

This is an example of rent seeking behaviour. The current licence holders are very profitable, so they have a strong incentive to try and protect (or even entrench) their current position, so that they can remain equally (or more) profitable in the future. This is why firms sometimes surprisingly prefer their own industry to be strictly regulated - it keeps out the competition.

Also interesting is that this is also a case where public health advocates might actually agree with the alcohol sellers. As I noted in my 2018 post, having local alcohol monopolies increases the price, and reduces the quantity of alcohol consumed, leading to less alcohol-related harm. This is almost literally the example of 'bootleggers and Baptists', first coined by the economist Bruce Yandle in the 1980s. Yandle noted that government regulations are often supported both by groups that propose the regulation (the Baptists), and by groups that should in theory be harmed but actually profit from the regulation (the bootleggers).

So, market power in alcohol sales may have value in two ways - value for the licence holders (higher profits) and value for public health (lower alcohol-related harm).

[HT: Eric Crampton at Offsetting Behaviour]

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Thursday, 9 June 2022

Ethnic diversity of local government and decision-making gridlock

Is it better to have more (ethnically) diverse local government, or less diverse local government? There are valid theoretical arguments in both directions. If local government leaders (e.g. elected council members) are more diverse, then they will have a diversity of opinions and preferences, possibly leading to more disagreements and less consensus decision-making, and government may become 'gridlocked', unable to make key decisions. On the other hand, local government leaders do feel electoral pressure, including the pressure to conform, and to the extent that there is effective electoral pressure, gridlock would not be a problem.

Whether more diverse local governments spend less on public goods (or not) is the subject of this 2017 article by Brian Beach (College of William & Mary) and Daniel Jones (University of South Carolina), published in the American Economic Journal: Economic Policy (ungated version here). They use data from the:

...California Election Data Archive (CEDA), which provides the names and number of votes for every candidate in every local government election occurring between 1995 and 2011.

For the 5177 candidates who won elections (or were close but lost) over the period from 2005 to 2011, they collect data on ethnicity, either directly from city councils, or by asking workers on Amazon Mechanical Turk (mTurk) to classify the candidates' ethnicities. They got 10 mTurk workers to classify each candidate, and had 94 percent agreement overall (they drop the 31 candidates who had low agreement from their sample). This was similar to the level of agreement between mTurk workers and city council data (95 percent).

Beach and Jones then measure the ethnic diversity of each city council, using indices of fractionalisation and polarisation. As they explain:

Both indices range from zero to one, where zero corresponds to a situation where there is no diversity. Fractionalization is maximized when each council member is of a different ethnicity. Polarization, on the other hand, is maximized when the seats are distributed into two ethnic groups.

The outcome variable that Beach and Jones are most interested in is public goods expenditure, which they calculate:

...by taking a city’s total expenditures for the year and removing expenditures on “government administration” and debt repayment. The “public goods” category therefore includes all spending on roads, parks, police protection, sewerage, public transportation, etc.

Now, a simple regression approach would be to look at the relationship between diversity (fractionalisation and polarisation) and public goods spending. The problem with that approach is the potential for endogeneity - maybe there are city-level factors that affect both the diversity of local government and local public goods spending. For example, perhaps having a more diverse population requires a greater variety of public goods, and more public goods spending, but also tends to lead to a more diverse city council. In that case, the relationship between diversity of the council and public goods spending is biased because of the relationship of both variables to the diversity of the population overall. Beach and Jones deal with that problem by looking at what happens subsequent to close elections, where one of the candidates is the majority ethnicity, and one is a minority. In sufficiently close elections, it is close to random which candidate is ultimately elected, provided some random variation in the diversity of the council, that doesn't depend on any other variable.

Beach and Jones identify 684 close elections with candidates of different ethnicities over the period from 2006 to 2009. Using that data, they find that:

Regardless of whether we measure diversity with fractionalization... or polarization... there is a strong and positive relationship between the election of a non-modal candidate and the diversity of the city council.

No surprises there. Electing a minority candidate increases the diversity of the council. Moving onto the effect on public goods, they find that:

...per capita spending on public goods falls by approximately 13 percent (significant at the 1 percent level) following the election of a non-modal candidate. The effect on nonpublic goods spending remains positive (roughly 14 percent) but is not significant at conventional levels.

So, more diverse local governments spend less on public goods. Beach and Jones then drill down into potential mechanisms that explain their results, and the consequences, and show that:

Our results indicate that diversity leads to gridlock. Cities reduce the amount they spend on public goods as their city council becomes increasingly diverse. These effects are largest for segregated cities and cities with more income inequality (where the potential for disagreement may be largest). We also find that all members of a council that experienced an exogenous shock to diversity receive fewer votes when they run for reelection. This latter point suggests that the city’s population is dissatisfied with the decline in public goods, ruling out the possibility that diverse councils simply achieve greater efficiency in public good provision.

So, ethnic diversity of local government appears to encourage gridlock, reducing local public goods spending, and it isn't an outcome that citizens favour. However, one thing that Beach and Jones didn't consider, is whether (or to what extent) a match between the majority ethnicity of local government and the majority ethnicity of the population matters. Or whether the effect is different at different levels of ethnic representativeness. Those would be interesting follow-up questions.

Also, the negative implications of this research need to be juxtaposed with the problem of groupthink. Groupthink occurs when there is too much consensus, leading to decision-making that lacks critical evaluation. This is more likely when the group of decision-makers is less diverse. So, perhaps the quantity of public goods spending is higher when there is less diversity in local government, but perhaps the quality of that spending is lower?