Turkish inflation drives consumers to incur extreme shoe-leather costs

Inflation imposes costs on people. One of the costs of inflation is that it gives people strong incentives to spend time and effort avoiding higher prices. They can do that by reducing their cash holdings, searching harder for low prices, or, in extreme cases, travelling to shop elsewhere. When inflation is high, and prices are increasing rapidly, consumers have a strong incentive to spend a lot of time doing these things. Economists call these shoe-leather costs, because when consumers have to walk around a lot of stores in order to compare prices, their shoes wear out. At least, that's a literal explanation of the term. In an age where prices are published online, the actual act of 'walking around to compare prices' is a lot easier on the shoes. Or is it? An extreme example has been playing out recently, as reported in Bloomberg last November (paywalled, but you can find an ungated version here):

Almost every month, Cihan Citak gets into his car, passport in hand, and sets off from Istanbul to Alexandroupolis, a Greek seaside city 40 kilometers (25 miles) from the Turkish border. After a roughly four-hour drive, he walks the crowded aisles of the local supermarket, filling his cart with wine, cheese and other groceries that cost a fraction of what they do back home...

Cross-border retail has become routine for many who found that Turkey’s surging food prices and stronger lira make Greece a cheaper alternative for everyday purchases. The trend, while not new, is accelerating: 6% of all Turks crossing the border to Greece in the first nine months of the year were on a shopping run, the highest share of overall travelers since at least 2012, data from the country’s statistics agency show.

When inflation causes people to drive four hours in order to find lower prices, you know the shoe-leather costs must be high. The inflation rate in Türkiye is over 30 percent. That isn't hyper-inflation, but it is very high. For comparison in New Zealand, the inflation rate spiked at about 7 percent just after the pandemic, but that was the highest it had been in over 30 years. Inflation more recently has been between 2.5 and 3.5 percent, which is higher than the Reserve Bank's mandate to keep inflation between one and three percent in the medium to long term.

All of that is to say that Türkiye’s much higher inflation creates much stronger incentives for consumers to incur shoe-leather costs to avoid higher prices than is currently the case in New Zealand

[HT: New Zealand Herald, also paywalled]

This week in research #128

Here's what caught my eye in research over the past week:

• Ruggles tests Richard Easterlin's argument that the economic and social prospects of a generation are influenced by the size of the cohort relative to adjacent cohorts, and finds using US data from 1910 to 2040 that the theory fits the data well for the period from 1940 to 1980 but fails in later decades, although baby boomers exiting the labour force will likely lead to increases in wages in the future
• de Bondt and Sun (with ungated earlier version here) use ChatGPT to classify activity sentiment scores from Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) news releases, then use those scores to 'nowcast' GDP, finding that on average, out-of-sample forecast accuracy improves by about 20% apart from the two most recent years
• Skali et al. (open access) find that better-looking Swiss politicians are not more prone to rent-seeking through interest group affiliations, and do not deviate more from their voters' preferences
• Jin, Karim, and Schulze (open access) find that Islamist terror attacks created significant negative abnormal returns in American and European markets, but the stock market effects of other terror attacks were almost nil

In other news, I wrote a quick take on the New Zealand Budget as part of The Conversation's coverage this week. That article also has a drop-down menu at the bottom that summarises the key Budget announcements in each area

Try this: Taxed

Today was Budget Day in New Zealand. The government revealed its forecasts of future revenue and its spending plans. There is a good summary of this on The Conversation (disclaimer: I wrote the blurb at the top of that summary).

The problem with the Budget is that the numbers are large, and it is difficult to get a good sense of the relative magnitudes. How do you interpret $1.18 billion in spending on rail network renewal and upgrades?

One of my recent students, Tyler Dunseath, created the Taxed website, that uses your income to work out how much tax you pay (weekly, fortnightly, monthly, or annually), then apportions that tax to the various categories of spending from the government accounts. So, for example, if your weekly income is $1000 before tax, and you don't adjust for ACC, KiwiSaver, or student loan repayments, you pay $165.77 in tax. Of that, $56.79 goes to social security and welfare, $37.40 goes to health, $24.25 goes to education, and so on. The results give you a better sense of how taxes are distributed.

Of course, there are a number of caveats, the biggest of which is that government services are a bundle, and while Taxed might make it seem like you could in theory say, "I don't want to pay $0.32 per week for international peacekeeping", it doesn't work that way. Moreover, a lot of government spending is on services that are public goods and therefore non-excludable, so even if you could opt out of paying for them, you would still receive the benefits of them.

Second, government receives some income that is earmarked for particular purposes. For example, the fuel excise tax is earmarked for the National Land Transport Fund. So, your income tax isn't distributed in exact proportion to the government's spending on different categories, because less of your income tax goes towards transport.

Third, the site doesn't account for the taxes we pay on goods and services (GST, or excise taxes on alcohol, tobacco, or fuel), or the user charges we pay.

With those caveats in mind though, Taxed is a pretty cool way of showing how the government's spending is distributed, and in a way that most people are more likely to understand than the millions or billions of dollars cited in the budget.

Enjoy!

[HT: Tyler Dunseath]

Is it better to have a more educated mayor?

It seems somewhat self-evident that having a more educated mayor would be better than having a less educated mayor. However, whether education is a positive attribute for a mayor really depends on whether, and to what extent, more educated mayors act differently than less educated mayors. Do they spend more, or less? How do they spend the public budget?

This new article by Alessio Mitra (University of Kent), published in the European Journal of Political Economy (ungated earlier version here) directly addresses the second question - how does mayoral education affect public finance? Mitra uses data from municipal elections in Italy over the period from 2000 to 2015, focusing on municipalities with a population of less than 15,000 (because larger municipalities use different electoral rules). He defines a more educated mayoral candidate as one with a university degree, and a less educated mayoral candidate as one without a degree.

Mitra applies a regression discontinuity design (RDD), which involves comparing municipalities that narrowly elected a more educated mayoral candidate over a less educated candidate with similar municipalities where the more educated candidate lost to the less educated candidate. In very close elections, the identity of the winner is plausibly as-good-as random, provided there is no manipulation around the threshold related to the education of the candidates. In other words, since the difference between getting 50.01 percent of the vote and getting 49.99 percent of the vote is essentially random, the education of the winning mayoral candidate is basically determined randomly in these close elections between candidates with different education levels. With that assumption in mind, observed differences between the municipalities where a more educated candidate won with those where they lost can be attributed to the difference in mayoral education.

Mitra's dataset includes more than 18,000 mayoral elections, of which 1211 have a margin of victory of less than five percent (which he defines as a close election, and includes in the analysis). He looks at the differences in public expenditure, initially focusing on changes in the share of spending devoted to operational expenses (or 'current expenditure' as he terms it) or public investment. In this, Mitra finds that:

When an educated mayor is elected by chance, public investment rises by 3 percentage points of total expenditure compared to a less educated counterpart.

Digging down into the allocation of that public investment, he finds that:

...educated mayors allocate an additional 1 percentage point of total expenditure to education investment, accounting for one-third of the overall increase in public investment.

And going a bit deeper than that:

Among education investments, immovable assets dedicated to nurseries receive the largest increase in resources.

Consistent with Italy’s balanced budget requirement on municipalities, there is no significant change in fiscal deficit. That means that the additional spending devoted to public investment must mean a corresponding reduction in operational expenditure. Mitra doesn't really dig into that at all.

What we take away from this paper is that more educated mayors devote more spending to education. In the Waikato Economics Discussion Group today, we discussed what mechanisms might underlie this difference, which is something that Mitra didn't explore. Perhaps more educated mayors see more value in education. After all, they invested more in their own education than a less educated mayor did. However, that's not entirely consistent with spending more on public investment in early childhood education.

A second possibility is that more educated mayors have a lower intrinsic discount rate, increasing their willingness to make long-term investments, both in their own education and in the education of their citizens. This is more consistent with devoting spending to public investment in early childhood education.

A third possibility is that more educated mayors may be better at the administration of public investment, such as project approvals, capital budgeting, grants, or procurement. This means that they have greater capacity for public investment projects. However, that greater capacity wouldn't necessarily be more apparent for public investment in education, or early childhood investment.

However, an intriguing but speculative fourth possibility is that more educated mayors understand that public investment can be used strategically to affect demographics. Many municipalities in Italy are facing extreme population ageing and/or declining populations. Mitigating (but probably not reversing) those population changes may be possible through creative policy. If the municipality invests in early childhood education, that may make the municipality more attractive for young parents to relocate to, and may reduce cost pressures that hamper fertility. The problem with this as an explanation is that it isn't clear that these trends and policy solution would be more apparent to a more educated mayor than to a less educated one.

The second possibility seems to me like the most promising. However, exploring the reasons why more educated mayors spend more on public investment, particularly in education, is a promising exercise for future research.

One last point is that the effects are actually quite modest. The total budget for a municipality of 15,000 population would be around €15-25 million per year (based in part on this and this, both in Italian, but see also here for public finance data for all Italian municipalities). A reallocation of three percentage points to public investment represents up to an additional €750,000 per year. And if one-third of that is spent on public investment in education, that is an additional €250,000 per year. It's not nothing, but it's certainly not building multiple new schools. Maybe it's an additional small school building per year.

So, is it better to have a more educated mayor? This research suggests yes, but that relies on a normative view that more spending on public investment, particularly in education, is overall a good thing. However, the size of the effect doesn't suggest transformational change, and we don't really know what the trade-offs are in terms of what categories of operational spending were reduced. A university degree does not necessarily make someone a better mayor, and this paper cannot tell us whether more educated mayors have better preferences, longer time horizons, or simply greater administrative capacity. What it does show is that who gets elected can change not just how much is spent, but what kind of future a municipality chooses to invest in.