Thursday, 2 July 2026

Airports and regional development

Most large regional cities have their own airports. Is that because growing regions are more likely to open an airport, or because having an airport leads to faster population growth for small regions? Probably, it is a combination of both, but empirically they are difficult to disentangle. However, this 2025 article by Jørn Rattsø (Norwegian University of Science and Technology) and Nicholas Sheard (Deakin University), published in the Journal of Economic Geography (open access) attempts to answer the question of how much regional airports contribute to growth.

Rattsø and Sheard focus on the example of Norway, where the number of regional airports grew rapidly from the 1950s, with fifty new airports opening between 1950 and 2019. They apply an event study difference-in-differences approach with synthetic controls. That means that they compare regions where an airport opened with synthetic controls made up of a weighted average of other regions, between the time before and the time after the opening of the airport. The outcome variable they concentrate on is the regional population, but they also look at employment (in total and by broad industry category).

Rattsø and Sheard find that:

...regions where airports were opened subsequently experienced growth in both population and employment, relative to otherwise similar regions that had been on similar growth paths before the airports were opened...

The size of the effect is relatively modest, with population growth about 0.4 percent higher after 1-5 years, 0.9 percent highers after 6-10 years, 0.5 percent higher after 11-15 years, and no difference after 16-20 years of the airport opening. Rattsø and Sheard also report a number of heterogeneity analyses, which are interesting too:

The population growth effects of new airports are largest and most significant for airports established in the first decade studied (the 1950s) and for new airports opened where there were no other airports within 100km... the growth effects are relatively large and more often statistically significant for airports that are physically larger (measured by length of runway) and that have a connection to at least one of the four largest cities in the country.

The first of those heterogeneity results points to a potential problem with the analysis. Airports are not opened randomly. Governments are more likely to open airports in regions where those airports are likely to have the largest effects first. And so, the effects being largest for the airports that were opened in the 1950s may be because those regions were going to grow rapidly regardless of whether an airport was located there or not. The synthetic control method attempts to deal with this by comparing regions with an airport with a weighted average of other regions without an airport, where the weighted average control 'looks like' the region that received an airport. However, this approach can only ever provide an imperfect control, because the reality is that the regions that are part of the control did not receive an airport, and if airports are allocated first to regions that are likely to grow faster, then the comparison with the synthetic control may simply pick up that fact.

The other heterogeneity results are consistent with what we would expect if regional airports do lead to faster population growth. If airports increase growth, then larger airports should increase growth by more. And connectivity matters, particularly to larger regions (although it is worth noting that when you have an airport, the flights go in both directions, and so it is by no means a given that increasing connectivity leads to net in-migration). The results for employment are also consistent with expectations, with increases in employment in the 'transport and communications' sector, as well as services.

Rattsø and Sheard rightly conclude that:

...the effects were concentrated in the early era of expansion when the air network was much less developed and similar benefits are not likely to be available today. In addition, the effects of having a small airport are limited: having an airport with little air traffic and few connections is not helpful for regional development. For peripheral regions, it may be better to improve road and other infrastructure to reduce travel times to larger airports with better connections, rather than building their own airports.

None of those conclusions should be surprising. However, the results from this study should caution against small regions in modern times arguing strongly for the opening of a new airport. Taking the results from this study at face value, where the air network is already extensive, adding an additional small airport will have little effect on population growth. There may be other good reasons to open a small regional airport, but expecting an increase in population growth should not be among them.

Friday, 26 June 2026

This week in research #132

Here's what caught my eye in research over the past week (a very quiet one, as I've been travelling in the UK, which also explains the lack of blog posts this week):

  • Skryabin tests the proposition that 'stolen food tastes better', finding that 'high-risk covert taking' increases pleasantness of food by 39.3 percent compared with legitimate consumption
  • Cortinhas et al. (open access) find that lecture absenteeism at UK universities is strongly associated with access to recorded lectures, inconvenient scheduling, less engaging sessions, and high student workload (no surprises there), and that tutorial attendance is higher when tutorials feature exclusive content, interactive problem-solving, and opportunities to ask questions

Friday, 19 June 2026

This week in research #131

Here's what caught my eye in research over the past week:

  • Chan (open access) finds that, between 1870 and 1910, ports which increased their proportion of steam in shipping volumes increased trade by diversifying their trade flows in terms of the range of trading partner countries and products traded
  • Brodeur, Kattan, and Musumeci (with ungated earlier version here) study the relationship between statistical significance and placement outcomes for 200 empirical economics job market papers from 2018-2021, finding that marginally significant results are associated with higher academic placement likelihoods, providing a strong incentive for young researchers to 'p-hack' for statistical significance
  • Gershoni and Stryjan (with ungated earlier version here) find significant declines in both exam attendance and demonstrated knowledge following the switch to online instruction during the COVID-19 pandemic in Israel

Tuesday, 16 June 2026

My take on that iPhone-fertility paper

If you've been reading the news over the last week, you may have seen talk about new research linking fertility decline in the US to the release of the iPhone. For example, the New Zealand Herald reported that:

Middlebury College economist Caitlin Myers and her student Ezekiel Hooper tested a hypothesis that smartphones - which emerged with the arrival of the first iPhone in 2007 - might have something to do with it.

Until 2011, iPhones were available from a single US cellular network, AT&T, so they compared US counties that had near-universal AT&T coverage with those that had little or none during those years.

And they found that access to the iPhone correlated with reductions in births by 4.5% to 8% at ages between 15 and 19, and by 3.2% to 6.6% at ages between 20 and 24.

There were also statistically significant but smaller declines among older women.

Other news sources picked up that the research attributed 33 to 52 percent of the decline in fertility to the iPhone's release (see here and here, for example). That result made me sceptical, and my concerns really echo those of Tyler Cowen here:

In 2008, 1.9% is the share of the mobile-subscribing population with an iPhone wireless subscription.  As a percent of all adults that is 1.6%.

In 2009, it is 4.3%.  3.6% of all adults.

In 2010, 6.8%.  5.5% of all adults...

So when the authors talk about diffusion explaining 33–52% of the decline in the general fertility rate among American women 15–44, I still do not get how that is supposed to operate.

If less than six percent of all adults have an iPhone by 2010, how could iPhones reduce fertility by between one-third and half? This requires very large spillovers from a small group of early adopters, and I am not convinced the paper has made those spillovers quantitatively plausible (we'll get to the authors' views on that later).

The research is reported in this NBER Working Paper by Caitlin Myers and Ezekiel Hooper (both Middlebury College). They use data on national wireless broadband coverage at the census block level to categorise US counties into those where less than 10 percent of the population have coverage by AT&T ('control' counties) and those where more than 90 percent of the population have coverage by AT&T ('treated' counties). Their sample includes 1399 'control' counties, and 914 'treated' counties (with 794 counties excluded from the sample). The reason that Myers and Hooper chose AT&T is because AT&T had an exclusive arrangement with Apple for almost the first four years after it was first launched in June 2007. The first Android phones didn't become available until October 2008, and didn't become widespread in the 'control' counties until a year later. So, there was a period where AT&T coverage is a reasonable proxy for the prevalence of iPhones.

Myers and Hooper then compare control counties with treated counties in terms of annual age-specific fertility rates (in five-year age groups). However, they recognise a key problem, which is that the treated and control counties differ in meaningful ways, the most obvious of which is that the treated counties are more urban than the control counties. This is a problem for their analysis because fertility rates have been declining more rapidly in urban areas than in rural areas, and therefore this would lead to overstatement of the measured effect of iPhone coverage on fertility. Specifically, the CDC reports that from 2007 to 2017, the total fertility rate fell by 12 percent in rural counties (many of which will be in the control sample), but by 18 percent in large metro counties (which are almost certainly in the treated sample).

Myers and Hooper try to deal with this problem by re-weighting their data in two ways. The first is by using an "entropy balanced Poisson event study", which effectively re-weights the control counties by giving more weight to those that are most similar to the treated counties in terms of their cross-sectional characteristics at the time of the iPhone launch. The second is by using a "synthetic difference-in-differences estimator", which creates a set of synthetic control counties by re-weighting the control counties so that the time series of fertility most closely matches each of the treated counties.

Using those methods, Myers and Hooper find the results that the news media has picked up. Specifically:

Both estimators imply large, statistically significant declines in births to young women. The post-gestation ATT ranges from −4.5 to −8.0% at ages 15–19 and −3.2 to −6.6% at ages 20–24 (the entropy-balanced Poisson at the lower-magnitude end, SDID at the higher), with smaller effects at older ages. Scaled to the U.S. county universe, these estimates imply the iPhone accounts for between 33 and 52% of the 2007–2011 decline in the general fertility rate. The pattern is similar across race, parity, marital status, and education, with the exception of Black women, for whom we estimate no effect.

The key results are summarised in Figure 3 from the paper (for the entropy balanced Poisson event study):

And in Figure 4 from the paper (for the synthetic difference-in-differences (SDID) estimator):

In both cases, the point estimates from the time before 2008 show no statistically significant difference between treated and control counties, while there is a negative (and increasing) difference between treated and control counties from 2008 onwards. However, notice that in Figure 3 (the first figure above), it seems clear visually that the downward trend starts before 2008, even if it is statistically insignificant. In Figure 4, there is no pre-trend, but remember that in the SDID analysis, the controls are reweighted to replicate the pre-treatment time series of fertility for the treated counties, so there should be no difference in the pre-treatment values by construction.

Myers and Hooper run various robustness checks that address some of the more obvious criticisms of their approach, including sensitivity to the choice of treatment and control cutoffs, using a continuous treatment variable, estimating the model in levels rather than logs, various placebo treatments, and truncating the sample to exclude any contamination from the release of Android phones. Among the placebo tests, they run analyses using Verizon's and Sprint’s pre-2011 coverage, and find no effects. So, their findings are not general to the difference between counties that attract mobile operators and those that don't. They also address the plausibility of the results, noting that:

The iPhone is not a treatment that operates at the individual level. Whether one’s own phone matters likely depends on whether one’s peers have phones; a phone in a friend group full of non-owners is a different intervention than a phone in a group where everyone has one. Spillovers run between phone-owning peers and their non-owning friends, and operate at the level of the group, not just the match: if smartphones reduce friend-group meetups and parties, then matches that would have formed under no-iPhone simply never do—the unformed match is itself the outcome.

That may be so, but the implied size of the spillovers is far larger than is plausible. If, as Cowen suggests, less than 15 percent of the population have iPhones, unless iPhone ownership and the spillovers from iPhone ownership were heavily concentrated among women of childbearing age, the overall effect simply can't be that large.

So, what has gone wrong. The overall approach that Myers and Hooper apply seems valid on the face of it, and re-weighting of controls to better match the treated sample is a common method of causal inference. The problem here is that the weighting is extreme. Myers and Hooper note that, in relation to the entropy balanced Poisson event study approach:

Balance comes at a cost: equalizing the marginal means requires putting high weight on a small number of treated-like controls. The Kish (1965) effective sample size of the balanced control pool is 77 out of 1,399 raw controls...

So, basically the analysis is heavily skewed towards a comparison between the treated counties and a small number of control counties, which are the control counties that are most like the treated counties (which also makes them the most unlike the other control counties). Those control counties are doing a lot of the work in this analysis.

There are also other possible differences between urban and rural counties that are approximately contemporaneous with the release of the iPhone. First among these is the 'Great Recession' and the housing slump around that time. Myers and Hooper do control for county-level changes in house prices, so that reduces concerns about contamination from that source. They also control for unemployment and poverty rates, which might pick up differential changes in labour markets. However, there was a change in contraceptive availability that directly affects young women's fertility, which is expanded access to the 'morning after pill' for 17-year-olds, although that occurred in 2009. Finally, after the 'Great Recession' there was a slowdown in Hispanic immigration, which might have affected urban and rural counties differently. Given that Hispanic immigrants tend to have relatively higher fertility than the US-born, so if the decline in Hispanic immigration was greater in control counties (and especially for the small number of heavily weighted control counties), then that might explain the effect. Myers and Hooper control for county Hispanic population share. However, it would be better to control for Hispanic population share among the age group that is being analysed, or to control for changes in Hispanic immigration.

This paper has certainly gotten people talking. Smartphones might be part of the story of why fertility has declined, but I don't think that we should uncritically take away from this study that the iPhone caused half of the decrease in US fertility between 2007 and 2011. More likely, it had a modest effect (if at all), and is confounded by a number of other changes that differentially impacted rural and urban US counties at around the same time.

[HT: Marginal Revolution]

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