Airlines are a strange business. They seem to have huge numbers of passengers, and yet we routinely hear about airlines struggling financially, entering administration, or shutting down. For example, in 2024 in Australia, Bonza collapsed, while Rex withdrew from major intercity routes after entering vountary administration (see this post for more on those examples). The most recent example is Spirit Airlines in the US, which shut down this month, after its second bankruptcy process in less than two years.
I just discovered David Oks's Substack, which has overnight become one of my favourites. The post that first attracted me was this one titled 'Why airlines are always going bankrupt', inspired by the Spirit Airlines story. Another recent post titled 'Why ATMs didn’t kill bank teller jobs, but the iPhone did' is also excellent, as is 'How funerals keep Africa poor'.
Oks's airline post has a huge amount of depth, so is difficult to summarise without losing part of the story. However, I'm going to try (but I really recommend that you read his entire post, as it is truly excellent).
Oks first notes that airlines are not just badly managed, they are structurally vulnerable and often fail to earn a positive return on capital. He then turns to the game theory of airlines, noting that there is an 'empty core' problem, meaning that there isn't any subset of the airline industry that can form a stable coalition, because some part of the coalition would always be able to make themselves better off by breaking away from the coalition. In other words, no group of airlines and routes is stable for long, because whenever capacity is tight and fares are high, another airline has an incentive to add seats. However, once those seats are added, the market can quickly become unprofitable.
The 'empty core' arises because airlines have high fixed costs, low marginal costs, volatile demand, weak product differentiation, and large minimum efficient scale. All of that means that adding one extra airline on a route, or one extra aircraft, can swing a market from being undersupplied and profitable to being undersupplied and unprofitable. So, what happens in the airline industry is that when there are few airlines, they are profitable and happy, but that encourages new airlines to enter, after which profits decrease until one or more of the airlines shuts down. And then the cycle starts over.
As you can see, there is a lot to unpack from Oks's post. Again, I encourage you to read the whole post. But the key points are, first, that airlines are always going bankrupt because the nature of the airline industry lends itself to a boom-bust cycle when airlines compete with each other.
Second, from the perspective of airline consumers (and, probably, governments as well) there is an uncomfortable trade-off. We want low fares from competition between airlines, and we also want airlines to be financially stable, but it may be difficult to have both. The pursuit of low fares can set off the cycle described above, with competition pushing fares down, leading to falling profitability, and eventually one or more airlines exiting the market. Airline financial stability, on the other hand, probably requires some limit on competition between airlines. One way of achieving this is to regulate airlines more closely, closer to the equilibrium that existed before deregulation in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when regulators had much greater control over fares, routes, and market entry. Airlines segmented the market, flew fewer routes, and were profitable in part because they were not actively competing with each other. The other alternative is to recognise that airlines can diversify into other markets. Oks’s most striking example of this is Delta:
...the most profitable airline in the United States, which started a fruitful partnership with American Express in 1996 and launched a co-branded card with them in 2008. Annual spending on Delta-branded American Express cards comes out to about 1 percent of U.S. GDP. In 2025, this produced about $8 billion in revenue for Delta, accounting for more than the entirety of its profit. That means that without the American Express partnership, Delta would be operating at a substantial loss. In effect, Delta’s aviation business is a loss leader for a much more profitable credit card partnership. So to the extent that Delta is now a good business, it is because it escaped the basic instability of the airline industry by becoming less of an airline.
Allowing airlines to operate in a cartel-like equilibrium, as airlines effectively did prior to the 1980s, doesn't strike me as a very positive solution, especially from the perspective of consumers. Having airlines shut down at short notice, cancelling thousands of flights, is clearly not good for consumers either. Perhaps then we need to tolerate airlines that try to sell us financial services, or unbundling the airline package and separately selling seat selection, checked baggage, meals, and so on (see this post about Jetstar's business practices, or this one).
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