Thursday, 28 March 2019

Killing crocodiles might save crocodiles, but only with closed access

I've written a few times about endangered species, and about how assigning private property rights (such as through farming) might be one way to save them (for example, see this 2015 post about lions). This article in The Conversation yesterday, by Daniel Natusch (Macquarie University), Grahame Webb (Charles Darwin University), and Rick Shine (University of Sydney), makes a similar point:
Banning the use of animal skins in the fashion industry sounds straightforward and may seem commendable – wild reptiles will be left in peace, instead of being killed for the luxury leather trade.
But decades of research show that by walking away from the commercial trade in reptile skins, Selfridges may well achieve the opposite to what it intends. Curtailing commercial trade will be a disaster for some wild populations of reptiles.
How can that be true? Surely commercial harvesting is a threat to the tropical reptiles that are collected and killed for their skins?
Actually, no. You have to look past the fate of the individual animal and consider the future of the species. Commercial harvesting gives local people – often very poor people – a direct financial incentive to conserve reptile populations and the habitats upon which they depend.
As Natusch et al. note, if people can earn income from harvesting and selling crocodiles (or crocodile eggs), then there is an incentive to keep crocodiles around. The most straightforward example of this is farming. People are allocated private property rights over crocodiles (they own them in the general sense), and that creates an incentive for each farmer to sustainably manage their crocodiles.

However, in their article Natusch et al. are essentially arguing that the incentives are the same if you are thinking about maintaining wild populations of crocodiles. That is, if people can harvest from the population of wild crocodiles, then there is an incentive for people to maintain the population. However, while the authors appeal to previous research that supports their argument, they ignore an equally large literature on the Tragedy of the Commons. A population of wild crocodiles is a common resource - it is rival and non-excludable. Rival goods are those where one person's use of the good reduces the amount available to everyone else, i.e. in this case killing one crocodile reduces the number of crocodiles available to everyone. Non-excludable goods are those where you cannot easily prevent a person from obtaining the benefit from them, i.e. in this case it would be difficult to stop people from killing crocodiles.

The Tragedy of the Commons arises because the private incentive (to harvest as many crocodiles as you can, in order to maximise the income for your family) is not aligned with the social incentive (to keep the population sustainable). It leads to over-harvesting, and threatens the crocodile population.

Farming solves this problem by assigning property rights - it makes crocodiles a private good - rival but excludable (because only the crocodile farmers can kill them). However, what Natusch et al. are suggesting would not work without some other controls in place.

As the Nobel Prize winner Elinor Ostrom noted, the problem with common resources arises when they are open access - when everyone can access them freely with no restrictions. Private property rights are one way to restrict access, but not the only way. Another way to manage a population of wild crocodiles would be to issue harvest permits, with only permit holders allowed to kill crocodiles. This would make crocodiles closed access, and is similar to how we manage fisheries with the Transferable Quota system. This essentially creates a property right - the right to kill crocodiles.

Provided only a few permits are issued, the permit holders would have an incentive not to take too many crocodiles, because that would limit their future livelihoods. The more permit holders there are, the more the solution starts to dissolve into the open access Tragedy of the Commons, so limiting their numbers is necessary for sustainability.

So, as Natusch et al. argue, prohibiting the killing of crocodiles is not a good way to save them. However, incentives alone are not the solution. Some form of property rights needs to be created to ensure the long-term sustainability of the crocodile population.

Monday, 25 March 2019

Registering guns vs. registering gun owners

Unsurprisingly, gun control is in the news, with the government having announced an impending ban on military-style semi-automatic (MSSA) weapons. That ban is long overdue, with the 1997 Thorp report noting that:
...the potential consequences of MSSA misuse clearly outweigh any benefit to society in permitting their ownership.
Any doubt as to how to measure the costs of allowing MSSA ownership was cruelly put to rest on Friday 15 March. Those costs clearly outweigh the benefits of farmers being able to rapidly exterminate rabbits without having to spend time re-loading their weapon.

However, this isn't a post about MSSAs. It is about another aspect of gun control - registration. New Zealand has a system where gun owners are registered, but individual firearms are not. In the U.S., individual firearms are registered, but for the most part gun owners are not (there are some differences in regulations between different states). What impact does the difference in registration systems make to the number of people with at least one gun, and the number of guns per gun owner?

Consider a system of gun registration. Every gun is registered. The cost of gun registration is included in the price of each gun that is sold (possibly the cost of registration is an explicit part of the price, or perhaps the costs of the registration system are borne by manufacturers or sellers, in which case they charge a higher price to compensate). [*]

We can think of this registration system as the base case, illustrated in the diagram below with the black lines. In this model, the gun consumer is choosing between buying guns (X, measured on the x-axis) or all other goods (AOG, measured on the y-axis). The straight black line is their budget constraint, which represents the most the consumer can afford to buy with their income, when there is a single price-per-unit for guns (including the cost of registration). The consumer purchases the bundle of goods E, which is on the highest indifference curve they can get to (I0). This bundle includes X0 guns, and A0 of All Other Goods.


Now consider what happens if guns are not registered, but owners are. This is an example of two-part pricing. Two-part pricing occurs when the price is split into two parts: (1) an up-front fee for the right to purchase; and (2) a price per unit. Here, the up-front fee is the cost of registering for a firearms licence. The price per unit is the cost of the gun. However, the cost of the gun is lower than it would be when guns are registered, because of the saving on the cost of gun registration.

Because of the up-front fee (firearms licence), the budget constraint starts at a lower point on the y-axis, since paying for the firearms licence is like giving up income for the consumer. Then, because there is a lower per-unit price, the budget constraint for licensing gun owners (the red budget constraint) is flatter than for licensing guns. Let's assume it passes through the point E (so the consumer could still purchase that bundle of goods if they wanted to). There is one other point that we need to recognise - if the consumer buys no guns, then they do not need to pay for a firearms licence. So Bundle C is also an option for the consumer.

When gun owners are licensed instead of guns, this consumer can now reach a higher indifference curve, by buying the bundle of goods D (their new best affordable choice). This bundle includes more guns (X1), and less of All Other Goods (A1). So, we would expect gun owners to own more guns if gun owners are registered, but guns are not.

Is there evidence to support this? Let's compare New Zealand and the U.S. In New Zealand, there are 245,000 firearms licences, and 1.2-1.5 million firearms (see the statistics at the bottom of this article). That accounts to a rate of about 5.5 firearms for each person with a licence. In the U.S., about 25% of adults own at least one firearm (see the statistics in this article), or about 60 million adults, and there are about 300 million firearms, or about five firearms for each gun owner. So, that provides some slight support for the model.

However, notice that the rate of gun ownership among New Zealand adults (245,000 out of roughly 3.5 million adults is roughly 7 percent) is substantially less than in the U.S. (25 percent). What accounts for this?

Consider consumers with low demand for gun ownership, as shown in the diagram below by the blue indifference curves (the red indifference curves show the preferences for high-demand consumers). With gun registration, the low demand consumer buys Bundle G, which includes X1 guns, and A1 of All Other Goods. When guns are registered, even many low-demand consumers prefer to own a gun.

However, if gun owners are registered instead of guns, the low demand consumer can no longer afford bundle G (it is outside the new budget constraint). The highest indifference curve they can get to is I0, where they buy Bundle C. This bundle includes no guns. These low demand consumers find themselves better off by not buying any guns at all, because then they don't have to pay for a firearms licence. [**]

So to summarise, licensing gun owners rather than guns leads many people not to want to own any guns at all. However, those who do own guns would tend to own more of them. And comparing U.S. and New Zealand data on gun ownership and the number of guns per gun owner seems to support this.

At this point, which system you prefer comes down to whether you want lots of people to have guns, or you want fewer people to have guns but each one of those gun owners to own many guns. Of course, registering both guns and gun owners would be preferable to either registration system in isolation, if your goal is simply to reduce the total number of available guns.

*****

[*] Another alternative is that the gun registration system is funded by taxpayers. However, there will still be some additional time and effort required to purchase a gun that is registered, so the cost will be higher than with no registration system.

[**] The story for high-demand consumers is similar to that in the first diagram. Here, they move from consuming bundle J (if guns are registered but owners are not) to bundle K (if guns are not registered but owners are). So, high-demand consumers own more guns in the case where owners are registered but guns are not.

Thursday, 21 March 2019

When sports teams are businesses, they might not try to win

This week in my ECONS101 class, we covered firms with market power. Market power is the ability to have an influence over market prices. Usually, we discuss firms that are sellers with market power - their market power allows them (as sellers) to set the price that will maximise their profits. They do this by pushing the price upwards. If there is only one seller in the market, and there are few close substitutes, the seller is a monopoly. However, sometimes it is the buyer that has market power. If there is only one buyer, then that buyer is a monopsony, and they would use their market power to push the price downwards (since paying a lower price would increase their profits).

Unsurprisingly, there are fewer examples of monopsony than monopoly, and most of the time when monopsony is discussed it is in the context of labour markets. One potentially monopsonistic labour market situation that was in the news recently was Major League Baseball in the U.S. (which is not surprising, as the baseball season is about to begin). In MLB, the teams are the buyers of baseball players' services. Now, MLB isn't a monopsony in the sense that there is only one buyer. However, if all the baseball teams work together (that is, if they collude), then the result would be as if there is just one buyer. And we'd expect to see low player salaries. Which appears to be the case, as Deadspin reported back in January:
Certainly, there are reasons to be suspicious. MLB owners are rolling in dough—league-wide revenues hit a staggering $10.3 billion last year, nearly quintupling since 1992 even after accounting for inflation. Yet owners are not, by and large, spending that windfall on player salaries as you might expect: The average MLB salary actually dropped in 2018, for only the fourth time in 50 years.
And then, of course, it’s reasonable to assume collusion when this is a league whose owners have been caught colluding before. (One of those four years of falling average salaries, in fact, was 1987, the year that Expos outfielder Andre Dawson, frustrated at remaining unsigned through March, gave in and signed a blank contract with the Cubs, ultimately turning in an MVP season at the bargain price of $500,000.) So: Owners raking in tons of money, players getting lowballed on contract offers, a league with a history of illegal labor actions, and it all adds up to dirty business, right?
So the MLB teams are paying players lower salaries. It seems like a slam-dunk (oops, wrong sport!) that this is a case of collusion and monopsony power. However, maybe it isn't quite that simple.

You would think that sports teams are trying to win, and that to win you want to have the best players. They would then compete with other teams for those players by paying higher salaries. Player salaries would increase over time.

However, the Deadspin article goes on to note (correctly) that teams are not trying to maximise wins, they are trying to maximise their profits. Having more wins does not necessarily increase the team's profits. The main source of team revenue (television rights) are shared between all MLB teams, and don't vary depending on the number of wins. More wins does probably bring more fans into the stands and increase ticket revenue, and generate more merchandise sales, but then you have to subtract the higher player salaries that are necessary to generate those extra wins. So, in fact it is possible that teams that have more wins may receive lower profits.

A low number of wins is probably associated with low profits (because ticket sales and merchandise sales will be low). A high number of wins is probably associated with low profits (because player salaries will be high). There is some sweet spot in between, where the team is maximising its profits by not having too high a salary bill, and yet generating enough wins to keep the fans interested in showing up to the games and to keep the merchandise selling. And since a team in the sweet spot isn't interested in competing for the best players, those players' salaries will be lower.

The MLB teams don't need to collude in order to keep players' salaries low. They just need to be keeping an eye on their profits.

Tuesday, 19 March 2019

Alan Krueger, 1960-2019

I was very saddened to hear the news that Alan Krueger passed away over the weekend. The New York Time has a good article summarising his work. Krueger was one of the world's top labour economists, and possibly most famous for his early work on the minimum wage with David Card, which used data comparing fast food workers in Pennsylvania and New Jersey and showed that New Jersey's minimum wage increase had no impact on employment. He also worked on the economics of education and on inequality, and was chair of the White House Council of Economic Advisors for President Obama.

In less policy-oriented work, he wrote (with Marie Connolly) about the economics of popular music, in the appropriately-named paper Rockonomics (ungated earlier versions here and here), which I blogged about here in 2017 (a post that drew comment from the author himself on Twitter!). He also wrote a book, What Makes a Terrorist, which I've been meaning to read and which, sadly, seems very relevant in New Zealand this week.

Unfortunately, you can add Alan to the (growing) list of top economists who passed away before they could claim a deserved future Nobel Prize (probably shared with David Card).

[HT: Marginal Revolution]