Wednesday, 19 April 2017

If laptops are bad for student learning, maybe mobile phones are too

Last week I wrote a post about how laptop computers were bad for learning in the university context. Naturally, that probably makes you wonder about other devices. If laptops are bad because they are distracting for students, are tablets or mobile phones just as bad?

A recent paper by Louis-Philippe Beland (Louisiana State), Richard Murphy (University of Texas at Austin), published in the journal Labour Economics (ungated earlier version here), provides some suggestive evidence about mobile phones, but in the context of secondary school. Specifically, the authors looked at data from students at secondary schools in four cities in the UK (Birmingham, London, Leicester, and Manchester) and at school mobile phone policies. They looked at how the implementation of a mobile phone ban at a school affected students' performance in the GCSE exams (which are standardised national exams).

Of course, the problem here is that schools will be more likely to implement a mobile phone ban if they believe that it will positively affect their students (including by increasing their learning), but Beland and Murphy rightly identify that this means that their results offer an upper bound of the effects of banning mobile phones from schools. It may not be a big issue though - only one of the 91 schools in their sample didn't implement a mobile phone ban at some point over the period they look at (2001-2011).

They find that:
...following a ban on phone use, student test scores improve by 6.41% of a standard deviation. This effect is driven by the most disadvantaged and underachieving pupils. Students in the lowest quintile of prior achievement gain 14.23% of a standard deviation, while, students in the top quintile are neither positively nor negatively affected by a phone ban.
The stated effects are only marginally statistically significant, and the effect (0.06 standard deviations) is not huge (which is why I labelled this as 'suggestive evidence' above). Beland and Murphy undertake a battery of robustness checks though, which suggest the effect is real (if possibly over-stated, given the self-selection of schools into banning mobile phones). Some of the supplementary results are interesting in their own right though, such as:
The interaction of the ban with prior achievement is negative... implying that it is predominantly low-ability students who gain from a ban.
The high-ability students (as measured by their results in testing prior to starting secondary school) were not affected by the mobile phone bans, but the low-ability students were made better off. This is similar to the effects of laptops in university classes I blogged about last week. Also:
...the impact of the ban is mostly on language based subject English and other subjects with no impact on mathematics.
Are mobile phones more of a distraction in English classes than in maths? I'm not convinced. This result is also a bit strange:
We find that less strict bans of mobile phones are more effective in raising student test scores than bans that prohibit phones to be on school premises. Exploring the impact of strict and less strict bans by prior student achievement, we find that both are effective in raising the test scores of the lowest performing students, but again that less strict bans are more effective. 
It's hard to see how a weak ban on mobile phones (e.g. students may bring them to school, but they must be on silent mode) would have a greater positive impact on student outcomes than a stronger ban (e.g. students cannot bring mobile phones to school at all). Beland and Murphy suggest that a weak ban may require more teacher time to enforce. Maybe. Perhaps the English teachers are more vigilant at enforcing bans than maths teachers too?

So, this is clearly not the last word on this topic. The negative effect may be small and statistically significant, but some of the other results need further exploration. Laptops may be bad for learning, but for mobile phones the evidence is not so clear.

[Update]: Peter Lyons says something closely related in this Herald opinion piece.

Read more:

Monday, 17 April 2017

Climate change and migration in poor and middle-income countries

I just read this 2016 article by Cristina Cattaneo (Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei, Italy) and Giovanni Peri (UC Davis), published in the Journal of Development Economics (ungated earlier version here, which I realised partway through reading the final published version that I had already read a couple of years ago, so perhaps I should have said I just re-read this article). The article looks at how changes in temperature affect international migration (and later, urbanisation), and has an interesting argument.

The authors suggest that higher temperatures reduce agricultural productivity, and hence reduce incomes in poor and middle-income countries. These lower incomes encourage more people to migrate to higher income (in this paper, OECD) countries, since the net gains (higher incomes, minus the monetary and non-monetary costs of moving) from migrating are now greater. However, there is a key difference between poor and middle-income countries, and that is the level of income (duh!) and hence savings, which people can use to pay the costs of migration. People in poor countries are less likely to have the necessary financial resources to migrate than are those in middle-income countries. When high temperatures lower incomes (and savings) in poor countries further, even fewer people from these countries would be able to migrate. So, the authors expect to see higher temperatures associated with more migration to rich countries from middle-income countries, but less migration to rich countries from poor countries. And indeed, they find that:
...in very poor countries increasing temperature leads to lower emigration and urbanization rates, while in middle-income countries it leads to larger rates. We also show that long-run temperature increase speeds the transition away from agriculture in middle-income countries. Conversely, it slows this transition in poor countries – worsening the poverty trap – as poor rural workers become less likely to move to cities or abroad. We also find, for middle-income countries, emigration induced by higher temperature is local and is associated with growth in average GDP per person, while the decline in emigration and urbanization in poor countries is associated with lower average GDP per person.
The idea for urbanisation is much the same. Rural folk in poor countries are less able to respond to increased temperatures (and reduced agricultural incomes) by moving to the city in search of work than are rural folk in middle-income countries.

These arguments do not extend to rich countries though, since agriculture is a much smaller share of national production in rich countries, and a much less important source of income for people, even in relatively rural areas. So, Cattaneo and Peri's results do not contradict mine for example, where the effects of climate change on internal migration in New Zealand are relatively small (see this post where I discuss my recent working paper on this).

Coming back to developing countries though, it is clear from Cattaneo and Peri's paper that climate change presents a particularly troubling potential poverty trap for the poorest countries.

Sunday, 16 April 2017

Book Review: Merchants of Doubt

I just finished reading the 2010 book by Naomi Oreskes and Erik M. Conway, Merchants of Doubt. The subtitle is "How a handful of scientists obscured the truth on issues from tobacco smoke to global warming" and is a pretty fair summary of the book. The authors have completed what appears to be a very thorough investigation of several scientists whose names keep appearing as combative opponents against the broad consensus views of scientists. The authors summarise their findings on pages 6-7:
In case after case, Fred Singer, Fred Seitz, and a handful of other scientists joined forces with think tanks and private corporations to challenge scientific evidence on a host of contemporary issues. In the early years, much of the money for this effort came from the tobacco industry; in later years, it came from foundations, think tanks, and the fossil fuel industry. They claimed the link between smoking and cancer remained unproven. They insisted that scientists were mistaken about the risks and limitations of SDI [the Strategic Defense Initiative, or Star Wars]. They argued that acid rain was caused by volcanoes, and so was the ozone hole. They charged that the Environmental Protection Agency had rigged the science surrounding secondhand smoke. Most recently - over the course of nearly two decades and against the face of mounting evidence - they dismissed the reality of global warming. First they claimed there was none, then they claimed it was just natural variation, and then they claimed that even if it was happening and it was our fault, it didn't matter because we could just adapt to it. In case after case, they steadfastly denied the existence of scientific agreement, even though they, themselves, were pretty much the only ones who disagreed.
The way that these scientists managed to get their views, and the appearance of a lack of consensus among scientists, was by exploiting journalistic balance required until the 1949 Fairness Doctrine. Under the doctrine, journalists in the U.S. are required to dedicate airtime or column space to present issues in a balanced manner, such as by presenting both sides of an argument. This sounds good in theory, but when one side of the argument consists of hundreds (or thousands) of scientists and the other side consists of a handful of naysayers, it is hard to see how this doctrine doesn't just reverse the bias in favour of the minority. And it was effective. The authors note (p.32):
...their ability to invoke the Fairness Doctrine to obtain time and space for their views in the mainstream media was crucial to the impact of their efforts.
This allowed these scientists to create doubt in the minds of policy-makers and the public, making it difficult for these groups to assess the veracity of scientific claims (and counterclaims):
"Doubt is our product," ran the infamous memo written by one tobacco industry executive in 1969, "since it is the best means of competing with the 'body of fact' that exists in the minds of the general public". The industry defended its primary product - tobacco - by manufacturing something else: doubt about its harm. (p.34)
The book goes through a narrative that is mostly chronological, with chapters devoted to tobacco from the 1950s to the 1970s, strategic defense (the Star Wars programme in the 1980s), acid rain and the ozone hole in the 1980s and 1990s, secondhand smoke in the 1990s, global warming from the 1990s onwards and the recent (at the time of writing the book) re-opened debate about DDT (a pesticide banned in the 1960s). Oreskes and Conway conclude that:
The link that unites the tobacco industry, conservative think tanks, and the scientists in our story is the defense of the free market.
Throughout our story, the people involved demanded the right to be heard, insisting that we - the public - had the right to hear both sides and that the media had an obligation to present it. They insisted that this was only fair and democratic. But were they attempting to preserve democracy? No. The issue was not free speech; it was free markets. It was the appropriate role of government in monitoring the marketplace. It was regulation. (p.248)
That may well be the case, but I was surprised that the authors singled out Thomas Schelling as one of their bad guys (in the climate change chapter), for identifying the importance of uncertainty in climate projections. And I was even more surprised that they also took issue with William Nordhaus:
What could be done to stop climate change? According to Nordhaus, not much. The most effective action would be to impose a large permanent carbon tax, but that would be hard to implement and enforce. (pp.178-179)
Later on, Oreskes and Conway go on to say:
A handful of economists in the late 1960s had realized that free market economics, focused as it was on consumption growth, was inherently destructive to the natural environment and to the ecosystems on which we all depend. (p.183)
One of those economists? William Nordhaus, though the authors don't note this. [*]

That gripe aside, this book was a really timely read, given the post-truth world we are currently living in, where it seems that even the most robust scientific findings are made to look questionable. If this book had been written now, I wonder if this passage would be even need to be re-written:
With the rise of radio, television, and now the Internet, it sometimes seems that anyone can have their opinion heard, quoted, and repeated, whether it is true or false, sensible or ridiculous, fair-minded or malicious. The Internet has created an information hall of mirrors, where any claim, no matter how preposterous, can be multiplied indefinitely. And on the Internet, disinformation never dies. (p.240)
For some more on this, I recommend this Tim Harford post (which, you will probably note, covers some of the same ground as the Merchants of Doubt book).

Overall, despite the minor gripe about Nordhaus and Schelling, I found this an excellent read. It also makes me think about the current situation in New Zealand with alcohol licensing and local alcohol policies, where the industry has funded some limited research. Food for thought.

*****

[*] This bit made me angry enough that the next book I am reading is Nordhaus's The Climate Casino. You can expect a review of that book in due course.

Saturday, 15 April 2017

Who are the global top 1 percent?

That is the title of a new paper by Sudhir Anand (University of Oxford) and Paul Segal (King's College London), and published in the journal World Development (ungated earlier version here). The paper answers the question in the title, and is based on a combination of household survey data and data from the World Top Incomes Database (one of the many famous outputs of Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez, Tony Atkinson and others, and now called the World Wealth and Income Database). The paper is also an update of this earlier paper by the same authors.

There's lots of interest in the paper, but here are the headline results:
...the threshold for an individual to enter the global top 1% in 2012 is an annual income of about PPP $50,600 per capita household income, or PPP$202,000 for a family of four. We find that for many developed countries it includes the top 4–8% of their national income distribution. These income groups are likely to include senior professionals and some middle managers as well as business owners and ‘‘supermanagers”... Among developing countries, Brazil has the largest share of its own population in the global top 1%, where 1.5% of its national distribution is in that group...
An individual in the global top 0.1%, on the other hand, has a minimum of PPP$181,000 per capita household income, or about PPP$725,000 for a family of four. This comprises the top 1% in the US, and the top 0.3%—0.5% in Japan, Germany, France and the UK...
The threshold for an individual to enter the global top 10% in 2012 was about PPP$15,300 per capita household income, or PPP$61,000 for a family of four. This income level would not count as "rich" within a developed country: for most developed countries this group includes more than half their populations. For the US the top 60.4% of its population is in the global top 10%, and for Switzerland the corresponding figure is 71.2%.
Anand and Segal also look at changes in inequality over time:
The two decomposable measures, MLD and Theil T, show that within-country inequality was rising up to 2005 — which was offset by declining between-country inequality — but that from 2005 to 2012 even within country inequality declined...
The income shares of the top 10%, the top 1%, and the top 0.1% also rise and then decline, peaking in 2002 for the top 10% and in 2005 for the top 1% and the top 0.1%...
I note that declining global inequality is consistent with other recent research (see for example my post here). Anand and Segal find that the turning point for global inequality was around 2005.

The focus of the paper overall is the increasing trend towards people in developing countries joining the global top one percent. Here's what they conclude:
The turning point for the participation of the emerging economies in the global income rich appears to have been around 2005, which mirrors our finding that the advanced economies’ share of WEF [MC: World Economic Forum] attendees peaked in 2006 and has been on a declining trend since then. Moreover, we find that global inequality starts to decline around the same time, and that top 1% income shares within countries start to decline also from 2005. This trend was no doubt sharpened by the global financial crisis in 2008, which is having a lasting effect of slow growth in the advanced countries. But many developing countries were already converging with the developed economies before that point. As long as emerging economies continue to grow faster than the developed countries — which seems likely for the near future — we can expect both trends to continue.
None of that should surprise us.