Wednesday, 1 March 2017

Future life expectancy is good for NZ men, but be cautious

What are the limits of human life expectancy? I don't think any of us really know. Last month, I posted about an article in the journal Nature that claimed we were already at the limit by the mid-1990s. Now, almost at the other extreme, a new article by Vasilis Kontis (Imperial College London) and others, and published in the The Lancet (and appears to be open access), projects larger-than-expected future increases in life expectancy.

Kontis et al. basically ran every major model type that is used to model age-specific death rates (21 models in all) across 35 industrialised (high-income) countries, and then took a weighted average of those models [*]. The modelling approach also allowed them to make probabilistic forecasts (which is something that Jacques Poot and I have been working on, in terms of population projections, for many years). They looked at life expectancy at birth, and life expectancy (remaining life years) at age 65. I'm just going to focus on the first of those. Here's what they found:
Taking model uncertainty into account, we project that life expectancy will increase in all of these 35 countries with a probability of at least 65% for women and 85% for men, although the increase will vary across countries. There is nonetheless a 35% probability that life expectancy will stagnate or decrease in Japanese women by 2030, followed by a 14% probability in Bulgarian men and 11% in Finnish women...
There is 90% probability that life expectancy at birth among South Korean women in 2030 will be higher than 86·7 years, the same as the highest life expectancy in the world in 2012, and a 57% probability that it will be higher than 90 years... a level that was considered virtually unattainable at the turn of the 21st century by some researchers.
So, they are offering better than even odds that life expectancy for South Korean women will exceed 90 years by 2030, a point that has been picked up in the media (see for example here and here). However, something that wasn't picked up (even by the NZ media) was the somewhat surprising projection for male life expectancy in New Zealand. Here's the relevant part of their Figure 3:


Male life expectancy in New Zealand for 2010 is already one of the highest in those 35 countries (ranking us sixth out of 35), but look at the left panel of the graph, which is their projection for 2030. Notice that, based on the median projection (the red dot), New Zealand pretty much retains its same ranking. However, notice also that the green smudge (the distribution of projected life expectancies) for New Zealand is much wider than for other countries (I guess they are much less certain about their projection for New Zealand). That leads to, on the right panel of the graph, New Zealand having a relatively high probability of holding the top ranking for male life expectancy in 2030. I must say I was a little surprised by this. Maybe good reason for men to stay in New Zealand?

There's a lot to commend in this research, and the BMJ article is not too mathy (but I wouldn't recommend reading the online appendix on that score). However, it isn't without its problems. The authors have done a good job of using multiple models and bringing them together using a weighted average.

However, one of the key problems with models is that they are less good at extrapolating beyond the range of data that are inputs into the model. And essentially, that is unavoidable when it comes to projecting life expectancy. No industrialised country has ever had life expectancy before as high as it is in those countries today, let alone projecting future further gains in life expectancy. One of the big remaining questions in human biology is the limits to human lifespan, and this sort of trend extrapolation doesn't really help us to understand that. There may be biological limits to lifespan that we haven't approached yet and maybe we won't even know we have approached them until we hit them. At which point, extrapolations of past trends will not be a good predictor of future gains in life expectancy.

The authors themselves note:
Early life expectancy gains in South Korea, which has the highest projected life expectancy, and previous to that in Japan, were driven by declines in deaths from infections in children and adults; more recent gains have been largely due to postponement of death from chronic diseases.
That's not just true in South Korea and Japan, but all industrialised countries. For most of these countries, the future gains in life expectancy at birth that could arise from further reductions in infant and child mortality are limited. The low-hanging fruit of life expectancy gains have already been picked. Further increases in life expectancy now are most likely to arise through reductions in the 'stupid-young-male effect' (e.g. reductions in injury deaths). Remember that life expectancy at birth is measured as the age by which half of that birth cohort will have died (half would still be alive). So, life extending medical technologies that work for the very-old (likely to be those already above the median age for those born in their cohort) will have no effect on measured life expectancy.

Overall, it might be wise to be more cautious in interpreting these projected gains in life expectancy. For New Zealand men, it may be premature to be popping champagne in anticipation of our long-livedness.

*****

[*] What they actually did is called Bayesian model averaging, which essentially means that they weighted the models by how good they are at predicting actual data, with models that are better predictors receiving higher weights.

Sunday, 26 February 2017

Book Review: Diversity Explosion

I just finished reading "Diversity Explosion: How new racial demographics are remaking America", by William Frey. I thought this would be quite relevant to my work on the CADDANZ (Capturing the Diversity Dividend for Aotearoa New Zealand) project, and a good follow-up to reading Thomas Schelling's "Micromotives and Macrobehavior" (which I reviewed a couple of weeks ago).

Overall, I found the book to be a really interesting read, but that was mainly for the first few chapters, and the last few chapters. Frey essentially uses the book to outline the demographic (specifically, ethnic) changes that the US has undergone over the period 2000-2010. He takes a longer perspective in parts, but mostly the focus is on the (sometimes dramatic) subnational changes that have occurred and will continue into the future. A couple of the trends were quite surprising to me such as this bit:
...white-only flight to the suburbs is a thing of the past. In fact, nearly one-third of large metropolitan suburbs showed a loss of whites between 2000 and 2010, and Hispanics are now the biggest drivers of growth of the nation's metropolitan population in both cities and suburbs. Today, it is racial minorities, in their quest for the suburban dream, who are generating new growth and vitality in the suburbs, just as immigrant groups did in the cities in an earlier era.
And this bit:
Thirteen of the 20 cities with the largest black populations (including nine of the ten largest) registered declines in their black populations in 2000-10...
The latter trend is related to the former, in the sense that there has been a huge increase in suburbanisation of the black population since 2000, to the extent that Hispanics (rather than blacks) now constitute the largest minority group in U.S. cities as a whole.

Some parts of the book seemed rather quaint to me (or to you they may be odd), such as the old-fashioned treatment of race vs. ethnicity, where Hispanic is an ethnic classification, but all others are racial. All the papers I have read that talk about "non-Hispanic white" population suddenly made a bit more sense, although the classification is really worrying. To be fair, Frey himself notes:
It can be argued that the distinction between race and ethnicity, as the Census Bureau applies it to the Hispanic population, is an artificial one.
We can only work with the data that are available, and until the US Census Bureau gets its act together on ethnic classification, US studies are pretty much stuck with the current situation.

This bit also made me smile:
It was punctuated by the arrival in 2011 of the first "majority-minority" birth cohort: the first cohort in which the majority of U.S. babies were nonwhite minorities...
I smiled because it reminded me of this cartoon, which sums up the white-centric nature of the above quote (and to some extent, the whole book):


The early chapters introduce the idea of the 'cultural generation gap' between "the diverse youth population and the growing, older, still predominantly white population". This generation gap will be exacerbated by the faster population growth of the more youthful minorities (especially Hispanics) compared with slower population growth among whites.

Most of the middle chapters will not be of interest to the general reader (unless you are really interested in the finer points of the subnational distribution of ethnic groups in the U.S.), but the final chapters are more interesting, including where Frey attempts to draw out the political or electoral implications of the change ethnic mix. I wish I had read this book before the 2016 presidential election, and in light of that result there are some sentences that Frey might want back, such as:
If Romney could have eked out a victory, perhaps with greater white voter turnout, it would probably have been the "last hurrah" for a party strategy that relied primarily on whites as its base.
Which, of course, was exactly Trump's strategy (if you believe there was a strategy). A map later in that chapter was really interesting, because it laid out the number of states that Obama won in the 2012 election, due to minorities but not whites. With the benefit of hindsight, perhaps viewing those maps would have made some of the Clinton-boosters take pause.

Anyway, there are a number of interesting graphics in the book, with thoughtful (and though-provoking) commentary. Probably I will look to reproduce some of the graphics (but using New Zealand data) sometime in the future. This book would be a good read for anyone interested in ethnicity statistics, particularly in the context of the U.S.

[HT: Tahu Kukutai, for the cartoon, which she used in her Pathways conference presentation (PDF) last year]

Saturday, 25 February 2017

Kenneth Arrow, 1921-2017

Last week one of the greatest minds in economics passed away. In 1972 at the age of 51, Kenneth Arrow was the youngest ever to win the Nobel Prize in economics (a record he still holds), and five of his students have gone on to win Nobel Prizes as well, including Eric Maskin, John Harsanyi, Michael Spence, and Roger Myerson. Maskin's student Jean Tirole has also won a Nobel Prize, so that is a 'family tree' that is really unmatched (at least in economics).

Arrow's contributions are really too many to describe in detail (A Fine Theorem has made a start - the first of four promised posts is here), but I see four main areas:

  1. Social choice theory - Arrow's impossibility theorem, which we discuss in ECON110, details how there can be no 'perfect' majority-rule voting system that satisfies a set of axioms that most people would expect from a 'fair' voting system;
  2. General equilibrium - Arrow, along with Gerard Debreu, proved the (theoretical) existence of a market-clearing equilibrium set of prices across all markets, and that the resulting equilibrium would be efficient (this is one of the bases for economists' claims that competitive markets are efficient);
  3. Health economics - Arrow wrote the first paper that teased out the complexities of health care as a good (which we discuss in ECON110), including the fundamentals of asymmetric information that Spence and others built on; and
  4. Measurement of risk - Arrow outlined the mathematical concepts that economists use to measure risk.
Of course, he made many other contributions than those outlined above. Tim Harford has a great post here, and the New York Times obituary is here. And here is a recent (2016) interview with the great man. He will be missed.

[Update: The second post from A Fine Theorem is here]

Friday, 24 February 2017

Climate change won't much affect internal migration in NZ

Climate change is likely to be one of the key challenges facing humankind over the coming century (or more). We are likely facing increases in mean temperature, desertification, rising sea levels, and increasing frequency and intensity of extreme weather. But how big is the impact likely to be on a country like New Zealand, anyway?

In a new working paper, I evaluate the impact of climate change on internal migration in New Zealand, and what that means for the future spatial distribution of population. That is, which regions are likely to gain population from climate change, and which will lose population? I make use of a gravity modelling framework (which I have written about before). Essentially, a gravity model suggests that the migration flow between two regions is positively related to the population of the origin and the population of the destination, and negatively related to the distance between the two places. I tried out a bunch of climate variables from NIWA to find those that appeared to have the biggest impact on internal migration, using data on inter-regional migration from the last four Censuses (1991-2013).

Three climate variables are found to have statistically significant associations with internal migration: (1) mean sea level pressure in the destination; (2) surface radiation in the origin; and (3) wind speed at ten metres at the destination. The sign of the effects suggest that migrants attracted to areas with more settled weather (higher mean sea level pressure); migrants are less likely to move away from areas with more sunlight hours (but interestingly, don't move towards those areas); and migrants prefer to avoid moving to areas that are windier.

I then embedded the gravity model within a cohort-component population projection model, which is something that Jacques Poot and I have been working on for a number of years. I used the projections model to evaluate the effect of different climate change scenarios on regional populations out to a horizon of 2100.

Including the three climate variables in the population projection model makes a small difference to the regional population distribution. The inclusion of climate variables increases the projected populations of Northland, Bay of Plenty, Gisborne, Hawke’s Bay, Taranaki, and Nelson. The overall impact is quite small, as you can see from the diagram below for Northland. The orange line tracks the projected population of Northland excluding any impact of climate, while the grey line includes the impact of climate. Bear in mind that Northland shows the biggest effects in relative terms - the effects on other regions are smaller.


I also looked at the effect of different climate change scenarios, and the difference between different climate scenarios is negligible. The diagram below shows the projections under different climate scenarios for the Southland region. As you can see, there is little difference between them (and that result is similar for other regions as well).



Overall, the results suggest that, while statistically significant, climate change will have a negligible effect on the population distribution of New Zealand at the regional level. This is not to say that climate change will not have important and substantial effects at very localised levels, as a result of sea level rise, for instance. However, most if not all of the displacement of people will be within regions. For example, maybe those displaced by sea level rise simply move a little further inland, or we build walls to keep the sea at bay.

Read the full working paper here.