Thursday, 23 February 2017

Price discrimination in tourism... India edition

This short post by Alex Tabarrok at Marginal Revolution contained this picture:


So, foreign nationals at the National Museum of India in Delhi pay more than thirty times the price that Indian nationals do. Of course, this type of price discrimination is a topic I've written about before. Here's what I said then (in the context of entry to Ayutthaya in Thailand, but the principle is identical):
Of course, this is an example of price discrimination - where different consumers (or groups of consumers) are charged different prices for the same good or service, and where the difference in price does not arise because of a difference in cost. So, in this case there are two groups (foreigners and locals) paying different prices for the same thing (entry into Ayutthaya, or some other tourist attraction).
How can they get away with this? Well first, price discrimination is not illegal. If it were, then you couldn't haggle over any prices (and haggling is almost mandatory if you are shopping at the markets in Thailand and don't want to get ripped off!). Second, the seller needs some degree of market power - they need to be able to set the price. Since there are few substitutes for seeing Ayutthaya and there is only one supplier, that guarantees some market power here. Ok, so that's the basic market condition for price setting sorted.
For price discrimination to work though, you need to meet three conditions:
1. Different groups of customers (a group could be made up of one individual) who have different price elasticities of demand (different sensitivity to price changes);
2. You need to be able to deduce which customers belong to which groups (so that they get charged the correct price); and
3. No transfers between the groups (since you don't want the low-price group re-selling to the high-price group).
Those conditions are generally met in the case of tourist attractions. Foreign tourists have low sensitivity to price (low price elasticity of demand) for a few reasons - there are few substitutes for visiting Ayutthaya (or other tourist attraction). Foreign tourists have usually also travelled a long way at great cost to get to Thailand, so the cost of entry into Ayutthaya is pretty small in the overall cost of their holiday. For these reasons, the foreign tourists are relatively insensitive to price and raising the price of entry isn't going to keep them away in great numbers.
Tabarrok asks:
 Is this fair or ethical? Would it be legal in the United States?
I don't know about the US, but it's not illegal here (or, evidently in India or Thailand). In fact, as I argued in that earlier post I'm surprised we don't see more of it in New Zealand. Price discrimination is a legitimate way for firms to extract additional profits from consumers who are willing to pay higher prices. It's just that it isn't usually quite as overt as in Alex's example.

Wednesday, 22 February 2017

Judge rules that snuggies are blankets, not clothes

Whatever faults you think New Zealand's GST regime has, the one thing it is definitely not is overly complex. At least, not in comparison to similar VAT or GST regimes in other countries. New Zealand's GST applies at the same rate (currently 15%) to pretty much all goods and services with the exception of some zero-rated services like dwelling rents, interest payments and some other specified financial services (see here if you are interested, or if you are an insomniac looking for a cure). Overall, this makes it fairly easy to work out which goods and services attract the tax, and what rate applies. It also avoids costly and stupid legal cases like the great Jaffa Cake controversy in the UK (a controversy that was reignited by an episode of The Great British Bakeoff - I kid you not). Anyway, on the original controversy, the Guardian reported:
As a nation we face many challenges and issues that no doubt we should be keenly debating. However, when gathered around their kettles you are just as likely to hear a couple of Brits trying to decide on the precise phylogeny of the biscuits, bars and assorted cakes that they are about to dispatch with their brew. To many of us, trying to win acceptance for our world view on whether a certain item is a cake or biscuit seems like quite an important task.
Typically, this debate has raged most fiercely over the Jaffa Cake, which despite being called a cake and having sponge cake as its base will always be viewed by many as a biscuit. However, within the industry its long been known that there is a Cinderella figure in the "cake or biscuit" debate, the teacake, which was once a cake, then became a biscuit and then a cake again.
"Does it really matter?" you may wearily sigh. Well, in the case of the Jaffa Cake it mattered a great deal to the taxman, as the somewhat bizarre rules concerning which products were subject to VAT and which escaped it due to zero-rating were a bit woolly in regard to the inhabitants of the biscuit kingdom. As a cake, the Jaffa was zero-rated, and given how many of them we see off as a nation that equates to a great deal of missed revenue. Biscuits are zero-rated too, unless they are "luxury" items, which according to the guidelines includes any that have chocolate on top. Cakes, no matter how opulent or fancy, are always classed as a staple food and zero-rated. In 1991 McVitie's and the taxman famously had their day in court and after a 12-inch-wide Jaffa Cake was produced as evidence they found, that while the product also had characteristics of biscuits or confectionery which was not cake, it had sufficient characteristics of cakes to be a cake for the purposes of zero-rating.
That's right. A court was asked to rule on whether a Jaffa Cake was a cake (and therefore attracted no VAT) or a 'luxury biscuit' (in which case VAT would apply). In a similar vein, I read with interest this story about Snuggies from last week:
Snuggies -- the wearable fleece coverings found on infomercials -- is now considered a blanket and cannot be taxed as clothing following a decision by the United States Court of International Trade.
The U.S. Justice Department argued in court that Snuggies are apparel and should be subject to higher taxes than blankets. The court disagreed, and found that Snuggies should be considered blankets and taxed at a lower amount.
Judge Mark Barnett's ruling means that instead of paying 14.9 percent duties when bringing Snuggies into the U.S., importers will only have to pay 8.5 percent duties, according to Bloomberg News.
Chalk it up to the craziness of tax and tariff administration. Luckily we have no such foolishness here. Yet. Which is why we should avoid any temptation to carve out exemptions or reduced rates of GST, such as for 'fresh food'. I'm sure based on the two examples above you can imagine some interesting cases of what constitutes 'fresh food' if this sort of proposal went ahead.


Monday, 20 February 2017

The irrationality of NFL play-callers

I recently read two papers that both essentially conclude (based on different aspects) that NFL play callers are not rational (or more specifically, not rational and risk neutral - an important point I'll return to at the end of the post). Recall that a rational decision-maker weighs up the costs and benefits of a decision, and when faced with mutually exclusive options (such as choosing which play to run in an NFL game), they should choose the option with the greatest net benefit (benefits minus costs).

The first paper (by Jonathan Hartley, an MBA student at the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania) looks at play-callers' choices between an extra point attempt and a two-point attempt following a touchdown. A rational and risk-neutral play-caller should choose whichever play provides the greatest expected benefit (expected number of points). In this case, Hartley found:
Between 2002 and 2014, the extra point conversion rate was 99.2% (out of 7738 attempts). As the average two point conversion rate remained 0.475, the expected points from a two-point conversion remains 0.95 below the automatic 0.992 points...
Over 2 seasons since the implementation of the new rules [increasing the distance the extra point try is attempted from], the extra point conversion rate has fallen from 0.992 to 0.95. Moreover, the total number of 2 point conversion attempts per season has nearly doubled...
In other words, when the NFL changed the extra point to being attempted from a greater distance (thereby making it more difficult), the expected value of an extra point try fell from 0.992 to 0.95 points. The expected value of a two-point conversion remained steady at 0.95 points. So, a rational and risk-neutral play-caller should now be indifferent between an extra point attempt and a two-point conversion. However, as Hartley shows in the paper, most teams still attempt very few two-point conversions, even those teams that have a history of success at them. The paper itself is pretty rough, but I wish the MBA students here could do this sort of work!

The second paper, by Noha Emara (Rutgers), David Owens (Haverford College), John Smith (Rutgers), and Lisa Wilmer (Florida State), is forthcoming in the Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (ungated earlier version here), and looks at serial correlation in play-calling. Serial correlation occurs when you have a time series (like a series of plays) and where each observation in the time series is related (positively or negatively) to the observation or observations earlier in the time series. Obviously, an NFL offensive play-caller wants to call players in a random way - what we call a mixed strategy. Mixed strategy is particularly important in sports - think of the choice of where to serve in tennis, or where to shoot a penalty or which way to dive as a goalkeeper in soccer (see here or here for more on this). If an NFL offensive play-caller doesn't effectively randomise their play calling, then the defence can potentially exploit some prior knowledge of the play about to be called.

Humans are rubbish at trying to create random series, and indeed that's what Emara et al. found, based on their dataset of more than 200,000 plays from the 2000-2012 NFL seasons:
...the previous pass variable is negative and significant in each specification. This provides evidence that, even after controlling for down, distance, field position, and other observables, play calling exhibits significant negative serial correlation. The Previous pass-Previous failure interaction estimate is negative significant in both of the specifications where it appears, suggesting that play calling becomes even more negatively serially correlated following a failed play.
To translate, play-callers are significantly more likely to call a running play after a previous passing play, and to call a passing play after a previous running play, than would be expected if they were selecting plays randomly. And on top of that, if the previous play was a failure (e.g. if it lost yards), then they are even more likely to change the play type on the following play.

To make things worse, Emara et al. find evidence that teams would be better off if they ran more plays that were the same as the previous play:
We find that a rush following a rush gains 0.14 more yards than a rush following a pass. We also find that a pass following a pass gains 0.21 more yards than a pass following a rush. Estimates are more pronounced when we also control for whether the previous play was a failure. We find that a rush gains 0.24 more yards more following a failed rush than following a failed pass. Also, a pass gains 0.34 more yards following a non-failed pass than following a non-failed rush.
In summary, we find evidence that the efficacy of a play, as measured by yards gained, increases if it follows a play of the same type.
The results is even stronger on second down plays, but not so much for third down plays. However, the take-away message, like that of the first paper, is that play-callers are not being purely rational.

However, there is a caveat here. If we think that, based on this evidence, that play-callers should be calling more two-point conversions and switching up play types less often, then we may be forgetting that there is also a wider game at play here. If play-callers are risk averse, then this affects their decision-making. The two-point conversion may have the same expected value as an extra point attempt, but it is riskier (see also this post on NBA three-pointers from last week), so a risk averse play caller may avoid the two-point conversion more than the simple comparison of expected values would suggest.

But what about the play-callers in the second paper? Emara et al. have thought about this, and this is what they offer:
Perhaps teams feel pressure not to repeat the play type on offense, in order to avoid criticism for being too “predictable” by fans, media, or executives who have difficulty detecting whether outcomes of a sequence are statistically independent. Further, perhaps this concern is sufficiently important so that teams accept the negative consequences that arise from the risk that the defense can detect a pattern in their mixing.
Making play calls that the fans think are predictable (but which are actually more random) may make the play-caller themselves at risk of losing their job (or at least, of looking like they are doing a poor job). So, play-callers may attempt to make their play calls look more random by switching (from run to pass or vice versa) more often than they should, even though this is actually less random and costs the team in terms of yards gained per play.

The question is, now that these trends are known, will any team want to exploit them?

[HT: Marginal Revolution, here and here]

Sunday, 19 February 2017

Is social media reducing teen pregnancy?

A couple of years ago, I wrote a post about some Melissa Kearney research showing that the MTV show 16 and pregnant reduced teen pregnancy. Here's what I said then:
So, the overall conclusion? If you believe in the IV approach, which many economists do, then 16 and Pregnant caused a significant reduction in teen births. If you don't believe in it, then watching more MTV is related to a significant reduction in teen births. Either of these is an interesting result in its own right.
Closer to home, New Zealand's teenage birth rate peaked at 32.85 per 1000 women aged 15-19 in 2008 and has declined since (to 24.89 in 2012; lower than the 29.4 in the U.S. in 2012). I wonder how many girls in New Zealand are watching 16 and Pregnant?
James from last year's ECON110 class shared this story with me (from March last year), which I've been holding onto for a while:
Teen pregnancies are at their lowest in eight years and some experts think social media could be partly responsible.
Data from Statistics New Zealand has revealed the number of teenage pregnancies in New Zealand among women under 20 years old has almost halved since 2007 - the year that social media became a global phenomenon.
In 2007, 4955 women under 20 fell pregnant. But last year there were just 2865 births to under 20-year-olds and a large majority of those were to 18- and 19-year-olds.
Some researchers have credited the stark drop to better access to contraception, better sex education and better parenting.
Others, however, have suggested social media may have played a part.
A leading paediatrics expert, University of Auckland Associate Professor Simon Denny, said it was possible social media had contributed to a reduction in "risk behaviours" including teenagers having unprotected sex.
"What we have seen is this reduction and at the same time we have had this explosion in social media," Dr Denny said.
"There are some suggestions that young people are spending more time inside rather than going outside and engaging in risk behaviours but there is no hard evidence on this at this point.
That, folks, is mistaking correlation for causation. While it makes a plausible story that teenagers are too busy on Snapchat and Instagram to have sex, the relationship may not be causal. Perhaps the causality runs in the opposite direction - teenagers are having less sex, so they spend more time on social media instead? Perhaps there is some third factor that has caused both an increase in social media use and a decrease in unprotected sex? Or more plausibly, perhaps these are just two trends that look like they're moving together but may actually be unrelated. If you doubt that the last of those would happen, try this highly significant correlation:


If you need any more, I suggest you go to Tyler Vigen's excellent site, spurious correlations (I particularly like that the number of movies Nicholas Cage has appeared in correlates highly with the number of drownings in swimming pools).

Anyway, on a more serious note, whether social media use and teen pregnancy are more than just spuriously correlated is an interesting research question. I'm sure a suitably motivated honours or masters student could dig into the data for New Zealand (and/or other countries) to find out.

[HT: James from my ECON110 class]