Monday, 28 August 2023

Japan's population decline is both a crisis and an opportunity

New Zealand's Population Conference is on in Auckland this week, so population issues have been on my mind. In the past, I've written about population decline in Japan. Things have escalated since that earlier post, as the Guardian reported last month:

Every one of Japan’s 47 prefectures posted a population drop in 2022, while the total number of Japanese people fell by nearly 800,000. The figures released by the Japan’s internal affairs ministry mark two new unwelcome records for a nation sailing into uncharted demographic territory, but on a course many other countries are set to follow.

Japan’s prime minister has called the trend a crisis and vowed to tackle the situation. But national policies have so far failed to dent population decline, though concerted efforts by a sprinkling of small towns have had some effect.

Wednesday’s new data showed deaths hit a record high of more than 1.56 million while there were just 771,000 births in Japan in 2022, the first time the number of newborns has fallen below 800,000 since records began.

Even an all-time high increase in foreign residents of more than 10%, to 2.99 million, couldn’t halt a slide in the total population, which has declined for 14 years in a row to 122.42 million in 2022.

The decline in Japan's population is intimately linked with population ageing. An older population has fewer births and a greater number of deaths. When deaths exceed births, demographers refer to this as natural decline. If natural decline is not offset by net migration, then the population will decline, and this has become the experience of many of Japan's prefectures (in others, net outward migration is a driver, with or without natural decline as well).

Pervasive population decline has impacts across society. Some impacts are clearly negative. However, in every crisis there is an opportunity, and as the population ages new or expanding business opportunities are arising. As the Guardian article notes:

Japan’s ageing population is already affecting nearly every aspect of society. More than half of all municipalities are designated as depopulated districts, schools are closing and more than 1.2 million small businesses have owners aged about 70 with no successor.

Programmes on the Broadcast Satellite (BS) channels are geared to an older audience, with the commercials a procession of offerings for funeral services, supplements to relieve aching joints and incontinence pads.

Japan’s underworld has not escaped unscathed either: a majority of yakuza are over 50 and there are now more gangsters in their 70s than in their 20s. Meanwhile, senior porn is a growing niche, populated by a handful of silver stars in their 60s, 70s and even 80s.

Japan is in the vanguard of population ageing and population decline globally. Many European countries are not far behind. New Zealand may have a younger population overall, and relatively higher levels of net international migration, but will not be immune to these effects either. New Zealand's outlying regions are ageing rapidly, as Natalie Jackson and I pointed out in a 2017 article in the Journal of Population Ageing (ungated earlier version here). I expect to write a lot more on this topic in the near future.

In the meantime though, business owners should really be thinking about how they can market to an older (and still ageing) population. There are opportunities there that seem to be under-exploited right now (and not just in the aged care sector).

Read more:

Saturday, 26 August 2023

Peter Siminski on making economics (and economists) better

Earlier this month, Peter Siminski (University of Technology Sydney) wrote an interesting article in The Conversation entitled "6 reasons Australians don’t trust economists, and how we could do better". Briefly, those six reasons are:

  1. Weak diversity and reflexivity;
  2. The media and conflicts of interest;
  3. Efficiency preferred to equity;
  4. A heavy international focus;
  5. Declining economics training; and
  6. Overconfidence.

Most often, economists face critiques like this from people outside of the discipline, but this time it is from an insider, so we should at least pay a little bit more attention. And I agree with all of his points, which sadly apply to the discipline in New Zealand as well. I encourage you to read the whole article. However, I just want to add to a couple of his points with a New Zealand perspective.

On the first point, I've written before about the lack of diversity in New Zealand economics (specifically gender diversity - see here and here). It's worth updating that data though. As of today, there are 76 economists in the New Zealand top 25% ranking on RePEc, of which only ten are women (#27 Suzi Kerr; #40 Hatice Ozer Balli; #44 Trinh Le; #49 Susan Olivia; #54 Anna Strutt; #62 Gail Pacheco; #68 Isabelle Sin; #71 Elodie Blanc; #73 Sholeh Maani; and #76 Paula Lorgelly). We're trending in the right direction at least, going from less than 8 percent women in this ranking in 2017 to around 13 percent now. It's still going to take a long time to achieve anything approaching real parity though.

On the decline in economics training, Siminski notes that at the high school level, "In New South Wales at least, economics has been mostly replaced by “business studies”". We have observed something very similar in New Zealand - a gradual replacement of economics (and accounting) with business studies. Where a decade or more ago about two-thirds of my introductory economics class would have studied at least one year of economics at high school, that is now down to less than a quarter. It's just as well that we don't assume any prior formal economics knowledge when we teach our introductory papers, because in the main it doesn't exist. Although that doesn't mean that students don't know any economics - see this 2014 article by Steven Lim and myself (ungated earlier version here). And, many of our best economics students didn't study economics at high school. I didn't study economics at high school (in fact, I didn't study any economics at all until I returned to university as a mature student). Nevertheless, we do face issues with non-economics students distrusting economics (and that may become an even bigger issue next year, when ECONS101 becomes compulsory for all business students at Waikato). However, in my experience, even a little exposure to real economic thinking can be enough to make students 'see the light' (or at least, to realise that economics is not something to fear or avoid).

Overall, in my view what really makes people distrust economists, and is a point that Siminski is too timid in presenting (as part of his discussion of overconfidence), is arrogance. Economists simply think we know more than other people (including subject experts) about any number of subjects, and we aren't shy about expressing this. I'm as guilty as any of my fellow economists of this (and this blog may be Exhibit A in the evidence of that). We could do with toning ourselves down a bit. Siminski is right in concluding that:

A large dose of humility would help, and it would help build trust.

Might that be too much to hope for? 

Friday, 25 August 2023

The price of beer in Abu Dhabi and Sharjah

In my ECONS102 class, we discuss the difference between a market where the sale and purchase of a good is illegal, and a market where the sale and purchase of the same good is legal. One surprising result is that it is not certain that the good will be more expensive in the market where it is illegal.

Consider the example of the market for beer in Abu Dhabi and Sharjah (two of the United Arab Emirates). Alcohol sale and consumption is legal in Abu Dhabi (although public intoxication is not), whereas alcohol sale and consumption are illegal in Sharjah (see here or here). Now consider the difference in the price of beer between the two markets. We can demonstrate this with a supply and demand diagram, as shown below. Demand for beer will be lower in Sharjah (DS) than in Abu Dhabi (DA), because consumers must consider the risk of punishment for consuming alcohol in Sharjah, whereas there is less risk in Abu Dhabi (unless the consumer is drunk in public). Similarly, the supply of beer will be lower in Sharjah (SS) than in Abu Dhabi (SA), because sellers face higher costs in Sharjah, due to the costs associated with the punishment of being caught.

Now compare the equilibrium price and quantity in each emirate. The quantity of beer traded (adjusted for population differences) is higher in Abu Dhabi (QA) than in Sharjah (QS). However, the equilibrium price of beer is lower in Sharjah (PS) than in Abu Dhabi (PA). How can this be? Notice that the difference in demand between the two countries is larger than the difference in supply. A lower supply increases the equilibrium price, while a lower demand decreases the equilibrium price. The two effects offset each other, so when the demand difference is larger, the net effect is a lower price. If, instead, the difference in supply was larger than the difference in demand, then the price would have been higher in Sharjah than in Abu Dhabi. And if the differences in supply and demand were exactly the same, then the price would have been the same in both emirates. In other words, while the difference in quantity is clear, the difference in equilibrium price is ambiguous - the price could be higher, lower, or the same in Sharjah as in Abu Dhabi, depending on the relative difference in supply and demand.

That the price may be lower where a good is illegal is quite counter-intuitive. The reason why this result is counter-intuitive is because most people jump immediately to what they think the price difference should be, and try to work backwards from that. However, economists know that you should never reason backwards from a price change. Instead, economists use a model (in this case, supply and demand) and work out the difference in price as the last step in the process (not the first step).

The result is counter-intuitive, but is it realistic? According to the website Expatistan, the price of a beer at a neighbourhood pub in Abu Dhabi is 40 Dirham, while the price of the same beer in Sharjah is 31 Dirham. [*] So, it may be realistic. Surprising as it may be, a good sold in a place where it is illegal may not be more expensive than the same good sold in a place where it is legal.

*****

[*] I have no idea how they gathered the price data for Sharjah. It is apparently based on seven observations as of June 2022, so I'm taking it at face value.

Wednesday, 23 August 2023

Movie ticket prices revisited

I've written a few times about prices at the movies (see here and here). One of the puzzling questions about movie ticket prices is why they are the same for all movies, whether they are blockbusters that will sell out the theatre, or low-rated B-movies that struggle to sell any tickets. That is the question that this recent article in The Conversation by Peter Martin (Australian National University) looks at. Martin puts the answer down to two things. First:

Queues for restaurants (or in 2023, long queues and sold out sessions, as crowds were turned away from Barbie) are all signals other consumers want to get in.

This would make queues especially valuable to the providers of such goods, even if the queues meant they didn’t get as much as they could from the customers who got in. The “buzz” such queues create produces a supply of future customers persuaded that what was on offer must be worth trying.

That makes sense for restaurants, where the queue to get in is quite visible to passing would-be diners. The queue acts to reduce customer uncertainty about the quality of the product. However, it is much less plausible that this effect works for movies. Even if there is a queue for tickets, there is no certainty which movie the customers in the queue are waiting to get tickets for. So, the queue doesn't really provide any information about quality for would-be consumers.

Second, and more plausibly, Martin notes:

Another is the way cinemas make their money. They have to pay the distributor a share of what they get from ticket sales (typically 35-40%). But they don’t have to pay a share of what they make from high-margin snacks.

This means it can make sense for some cinemas to charge less than what the market will bear – because they’ll sell more snacks – even if it means less money for the distributor.

This is a point that I have made before. Since movie theatres are constrained in their ability to profit from ticket sales due to agreements with the movie distributors, it is much better for them to keep the ticket prices low, and instead make money from selling complementary goods (like popcorn and drinks). This could even be an application of loss leading - selling the movie tickets at a loss, in order to increase the number of movie ticket sales, and make even more profits from the complementary goods.

One new aspect of movie ticket pricing that Martin didn't consider is movie theatres charging different prices depending on where the moviegoer sits. As the New York Times reported earlier this year:

Some middle seats at AMC movie theaters will be more expensive than others as part of the company’s new ticket-pricing strategy, announced this week.

AMC Entertainment, the world’s largest cinema chain, said in a news release on Monday that this new pricing system, known as Sightline at AMC, would be in place at all of its United States theaters by the end of the year.

The seats in the front row of the theater will be the least expensive and seats in the middle of the theater will be the most expensive, the company said. However, new prices will not affect showings before 4 p.m. or tickets sold at a special discount on Tuesdays, AMC said.

Notice that this is similar to how tickets to concerts are priced, and is an application of price discrimination. Some moviegoers highly value the seats in the centre of the movie theatre, as they have the best view of the screen. Some moviegoers are willing to pay a premium for those seats (I know I would be). The other seats have less valuable views, and would appeal to more price-sensitive moviegoers. The optimal price is lower for more price-sensitive customers, so charging a relatively lower price for less-preferred seats (and a relatively higher price for the centre seats) makes a lot of sense.

It will be interesting to see whether AMC's new pricing system works (or not). Regal Cinemas' trial of dynamic pricing for movie tickets (which I discussed in this post) was abandoned soon after it was announced (see here). So, we never really got to see if dynamic pricing worked or not. If the AMC system works, we can expect to see it rolled out at other cinema groups in due time. As I note in my ECONS101 class, in a Darwinian sense, the pricing strategies that we see persisting in the real world tend to be those that are working well (and contribute to higher profits for the sellers).

Read more:

Tuesday, 22 August 2023

Who pays for Europe's tariffs on Indonesian biodiesel?

My ECONS102 class covered international trade last week, so it was interesting to see import tariffs in the news. As Reuters reported:

Asked about this situation, a European Commission spokesperson told reporters that the EU was confident its duties on Indonesia were in full compliance with WTO rules and that the EU was ready to discuss the matter with Indonesia.

Trade relations between the EU and Indonesia have been strained by the bloc's move to limit imports of commodities linked to deforestation, which is expected to curb EU imports of palm oil from top suppliers Indonesia and Malaysia.

As well as biodiesel, palm oil is used widely in food and cosmetics.

Welcoming the European Commission's investigation, the European Biodiesel Board said it estimated that imports circumventing duties may have cost the EU around 221 million euros ($240.34 million) last year.

The association was also working with EU authorities to address allegations of fraudulent biodiesel imports from China, it added in a statement.

Let's put aside the issue of avoiding the import tariffs (or duties) - we'll come back to those later in the post. Instead, let's focus on the effect of an import tariff on the market for biodiesel in Europe. This is shown in the diagram below. [*] With no international trade in biodiesel at all, the market would operate at equilibrium, with a price of P0, and Q0 biodiesel would be traded. However, the domestic price of biodiesel (P0) is higher than the world price (PW). This means that Europe has a comparative disadvantage in producing biodiesel. In other words, other countries can produce biodiesel at lower cost (specifically, lower opportunity cost) than Europe. One of those countries with a comparative advantage in producing biodiesel is Indonesia. If Europe allows international trade in biodiesel, European consumers will realise that they can buy biodiesel much cheaper from international sources. The price for biodiesel in the European market will drop to be equal to the world price PW. At this lower price, European consumers will buy more biodiesel (QD0). However, European biodiesel producers will only be willing to supply QS0 biodiesel at this lower price. The difference between QD0 and QS0 is satisfied by imports of biodiesel.

Now consider what happens if an import tariff (or import duty) is imposed. If consumers want to buy biodiesel from the international market, they must now pay the world price PW plus the tariff. The price for biodiesel in the European market will increase to PW+T (where T is the per-unit size of the import tariff). At this higher price, European consumers will buy less biodiesel than without the tariff (QD1), but European producers will be willing to supply more (QS1). The quantity of biodiesel imports decreases to the difference between QD1 and QS1. This was the purpose of the tariff, of course - to keep a lot of Indonesian biodiesel out of the European market.

However, who pays the cost of the tariff. We can work this out by thinking about the areas of economic welfare. Consumer surplus is the difference between the amount that consumers are willing to pay (shown by the demand curve), and the amount they actually pay (the price). In the diagram, at the equilibrium price and quantity (without trade), consumer surplus is the area AEP0. Producer surplus is the difference between the amount the sellers receive (the price), and their costs (shown by the supply curve). In the diagram, at the equilibrium price and quantity, consumer surplus is the area P0ED. Total welfare is the sum of the two areas (consumer surplus and producer surplus), and is equal to the area AED.

With international trade (but no import tariff), the consumer surplus increases to the area AFPW. Producer surplus decreases to the area PWGD. Total welfare is the combined area AFGD. Notice that European biodiesel consumers are better off with trade, but producers are worse off. As a whole, European society is better off, because total welfare is larger (by the area EFG - this is a measure of the gains from trade).

Now consider what happens when the import tariff is applied. Consumer surplus decreases to the area ABK. Producer surplus increases to the area KCD. The government gains tariff revenue equal to the area CBJH (this is the per-unit amount of the tariff, multiplied by the quantity of imports subject to the tariff). Total welfare is all three of these areas added together, which is the area ABCD+CBJH. In other words, the import tariff makes European biodiesel producers better off (higher producer surplus), and makes the government better off (due to the tariff revenue). However, the import tariff makes European biodiesel consumers worse off (lower consumer surplus), and European society as a whole worse off (lower total welfare). The loss of total welfare is equal to the areas BFJ+CHG - this is the deadweight loss of the import tariff.

So, the import tariff policy has a cost to society (equal to BFJ+CHG). Ideally, you would want there to be an offsetting benefit worth at least as much. The benefits of the tariff are (hopefully) less deforestation in Indonesia, and associated pollution (from burning forests), environmental and public health impacts.

Of course, the import tariff also makes Indonesian producers of biodiesel worse off, because they cannot sell as much into the European market (because their biodiesel is now more expensive due to the tariff. [**] That creates incentives for the Indonesian producers to try to avoid the tariffs. The European Union is alleging that this is what the Indonesian producers have done, by selling their biodiesel to entities in China and Britain (which apply low or no tariffs to imported biodiesel), and then re-exporting the biodiesel from those countries into the European Union (and the EU applies low or no tariffs to biodiesel imported from those countries). This sort of activity is extraordinarily difficult to police, because commodities like biodiesel can be difficult to trace. It will be interesting to see how this case plays out over the coming months.

*****

[*] I'll discuss this diagram as if it is the whole European market for biodiesel. However, you can easily interpret it instead as the European market for Indonesian biodiesel.

[**] The gains or losses to international producers and consumers are not shown in the market diagram above, which only demonstrates impacts within the European market.

Sunday, 20 August 2023

The welfare consequences of 3c-per-litre petrol in Iran

The price of a litre of petrol in New Zealand is creeping up towards $3 on average (and is already over $3 in some parts of the country). However, as this Financial Times article (paywalled) notes, petrol in Iran is 3 cents (US) per litre, and that is causing problems for the government:

As western governments struggle to keep a lid on fuel prices, the leadership of Iran faces a very different problem: its petrol is just too cheap.

Heavy state subsidies ensure that Iranian prices start at just $0.03 a litre, a fraction of the $1.10 paid at US pumps or the $1.88 that motorists in the UK are charged to fill their cars...

Oil-rich Iran vies with Libya and Venezuela, which has proven oil reserves greater than Saudi Arabia, as the countries with the cheapest petrol in the world.

But now a widening gap between supply — which is limited by domestic refining capacity — and rising demand has forced the Iranian authorities to tap its strategic reserves and import petrol for the first time in a decade...

As the government makes a significant loss by importing fuel at market rates and then selling it to consumers at a much lower price, there is mounting pressure to end the years of ultra-cheap petrol to which Iranians have become accustomed.

Mohammad-Reza Mir-Tajeddini, a member of parliament, told local media this week that fuel subsidies were now three times more than the country’s total development budget, but “nobody dares to speak” about raising the petrol price.

When you have a subsidy in place that keeps a price fixed, and there is increasing demand, the subsidy becomes increasingly burdensome on the government, and society more generally. To see why, let's consider the general case of a subsidy, as shown in the diagram below. The diagram is more complicated than a usual subsidy, as we need to also consider that Iran should be an exporting country (although sanctions largely prevent the exports), and that fuel use is subsidised. As an exporting country (with comparative advantage in producing fuel), the domestic equilibrium price (P0) is below the world price (PW). Without trade, the market would operate at equilibrium, with a price of P0 and Q0 fuel would be traded. The subsidy is shown by the curve S-subsidy (because it is effectively paid to the sellers). The subsidy decreases the price for consumers to PC (3 US cents per litre), and increases the effective price (including the subsidy) for sellers to PW (note that, to make our diagram a bit easier, we'll assume that the subsidy makes Iran exactly self-sufficient in fuel, before the increase in demand). The quantity of fuel traded increases to Q1.

Now consider the impact of the subsidy on economic welfare. Consumer surplus is the difference between the amount that consumers are willing to pay (shown by the demand curve), and the amount they actually pay (the price). In the diagram, at the equilibrium price and quantity (and with trade not allowed), consumer surplus is the area AEP0. Producer surplus is the difference between the amount the sellers receive (the price), and their costs (shown by the supply curve). In the diagram, at the equilibrium price and quantity, producer surplus is the area P0ECO. Total welfare is the sum of the two areas (consumer surplus and producer surplus), and is equal to the area AECO.

With the subsidy (and still no trade allowed), the consumer surplus is the area ABPC, while the producer surplus is the area PWFCO. The government loses the area of subsidy, which is the rectangle PWFBPC (this rectangle is the per-unit amount of the subsidy, multiplied by the quantity of subsidised fuel). Total welfare is the sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus, minus the subsidy (the subsidy is subtracted because it has an opportunity cost of lower government spending in other areas), and is equal to the area AECO-EFB [*]. In other words, total welfare is lower by EFB as a result of the subsidy. This is the deadweight loss of the subsidy.

Now, consider what happens when demand increases (and the government wants to keep the consumer price at 3 cents per litre). This is shown in the diagram below, where demand increases from D0 to D1. The price for consumers remains PC, and the effective price for producers remains PW. [**] However, to keep the consumer price at PC, the subsidy must increase (shown by the new curve S-subsidy2). The quantity of fuel traded increases to Q2.

Now consider the areas of economic welfare. The consumer surplus is now the area GJPC, but the producer surplus remains the area PWFCO. The area of the subsidy is now PWHJPC. Total welfare is now AECO-EFHJB. [***] In other words, while consumers are better off as a result of the increase in demand (because consumer surplus is larger), all of that extra welfare arises from additional subsidy spending by the government, and the deadweight loss increases substantially.

It's no wonder that the Iranian government is worried. When demand is high, the subsidy becomes increasingly burdensome for government (greater spending on the subsidy) and society more generally (due to the increased deadweight loss). 

.*****

[*] The overlapping areas of consumer surplus, producer surplus, and subsidy make this tricky to see. However, there is a shortcut. The area of total welfare is the area that is in-between marginal social benefit (MSB) and marginal social cost (MSC) out to the quantity that is traded (in this case, Q1). When MSB is greater than MSC, this represents positive welfare (the area AECO). But when MSB is less than MSC, this represents negative welfare (the area EFB).

[**] If demand was the be satisfied only by domestic producers, the effective price for producers would need to increase. However, the government can import fuel from the rest of the world for the price PW, so this limits the effective price for producers to PW.

[***] On the surface, this slightly violates the rule above that the area of total welfare is the area that is in-between MSB and MSC out to the quantity that is traded. However, the cost to society of buying fuel from the world market is equal to PW, and so the MSC (with trade) is increasing only up to PW, and then becomes horizontal.

Saturday, 19 August 2023

Arnold Kling is wrong about the death of the marginal revolution

In a provocative post on his Substack last month, [*] Arnold Kling proclaimed that the marginal revolution is dead. However, Kling is wrong. Some of the things in his post are correct, some may be correct but are overstated, but others are just plain wrong.

Before we get that far, it is worth reviewing a few key points. Market power is the ability of a firm to influence the market price. For most firms, this means that they have the freedom to set their own price. As students are taught in pretty much every introductory economics course, the firm with market power aims to maximise profits, and does so by selling the quantity of the good or service where marginal revenue is exactly equal to marginal cost (for an example, see this post). The price that the firm sets is not equal to marginal cost, and it is not equal to marginal revenue. It is equal to average revenue, but average revenue is always higher than marginal revenue. So, the firm with market power will set a price that is greater than marginal cost.

Now, looking at Kling's post:

But marginalism went too far. Economists said that profit-maximizing firms will equate marginal revenue with marginal cost. In a perfectly competitive market, or so they said, price will equal marginal cost. (In a less than perfectly competitive market, as the firm expands output, it has to lower its price. Taking its demand curve into account, the firm sets marginal revenue—a number that is less than the price that it charges—equal to marginal cost.)...

In the twenty-first century, marginalism does not apply to pricing or to wage-setting. To understand the contemporary economy, we have to think in terms of overhead. Real-world business is often dominated by overhead.

Overhead, or fixed cost, is all of the cost that a firm incurs even if it sells no output. You need to pay for tax compliance. You need a business license. You have advertising and marketing expenses. You need to develop and refine your product. You need IT infrastructure. As you get bigger, you need middle managers, a human resource department, finance and accounting, a legal department, janitorial staff, security guards, and on and on...

For many businesses, the marginalist approach would suggest a price that is too low to cover overhead. In fact, the marginal cost is often zero. The marginal cost is close to nothing for:

—an airline with empty seats to carry another passenger

—a telecom firm to provide the bandwidth you need for a phone call or to view this web page

—an app to serve an additional user

—a college to allow an additional student to take classes

In all such cases, if the seller were to follow the marginalist principle, its price would not be high enough to cover overhead. It would lose money and go out of business.

A better pricing rule would be to set price equal to or higher than expected average cost, which is based on a projection of the number of users.

The first paragraph of the above quote is fine. The firm sets a price where the quantity that it sells will lead marginal revenue to be equal to marginal cost. The next bit about fixed costs is fine too. However, then things go wrong. By itself, the presence of fixed costs does not necessarily lead a firm to set a price that would not cover the fixed costs. As one example, see this post. A firm with high fixed costs and low marginal costs has economies of scale. That firm can set a price that is above average cost, by setting the price at the quantity where marginal revenue is equal to marginal cost.

Kling seems to be assuming that the firm is pricing equal to marginal cost. But that is only true of firms with no market power - firms in perfectly competitive markets. None of the examples he provides are of firms in perfectly competitive markets. Even if marginal cost is equal to zero, that doesn't mean that the profit maximising price (set at the quantity where marginal revenue is equal to marginal cost) is zero. Overall on this point, which seems central to Kling's argument, he is very much wrong.

Later in the post, he writes that:

An even better pricing strategy is to come up with a way to charge more to customers who are willing to pay more (inelastic demand), and to allow other customers (elastic demand) to pay less. That way, both types of customers contribute to covering your overhead, with the inelastic customers paying more.

There are many examples of price discrimination in practice. If Disneyland charges an entrance fee plus a per-ride ticket fee, it gets the most out of both types of customers...

One of my catch-phrases is price discrimination explains everything. By that I mean that most of the strategic decisions that firms make in marketing their products are attempts to implement price discrimination. This in turn helps them to cover overhead.

Business strategy ignores the marginalist rules. Managers put a lot of effort into coming up with ways to implement price discrimination. They don’t put effort into making marginalist calculations.

Conversely, economics textbooks ignore business strategy. They devote little attention to price discrimination. We need The Overhead Revolution.

I like that Kling is a fan of price discrimination. I am too. Once you know what to look for, you start to see price discrimination everywhere (like in this post from earlier in the week). However, he uses it as a counter-example to decision-making at the margin. Unfortunately, price discrimination relies on firms setting profit-maximising prices for multiple groups of consumers. In turn, that relies on setting a price at the quantity where marginal revenue is equal to marginal cost in each submarket (for examples of this, see here and here). His Disneyland example is not price discrimination at all - it is two-part pricing (as described here, or here).

For the most part, Kling is correct that economics textbooks ignore business strategy. But that doesn't mean that business strategy is not taught in economics courses. I devote a substantial proportion of my ECONS101 class to business strategy (and the lack of supporting textbook resources is part of the reason why there are so many applied examples for my students on this blog), and business strategy comes up in almost every topic. That should be what students expect from a paper called Economics for Business and Management.

Not all business strategy is price discrimination though. For example, in my ECONS101 class, I also cover bundling, cost-plus pricing, two-part pricing, block pricing, limit pricing, loss leading, customer lock-in, and more. Many firms actually use a combination of these strategies (often combined with price discrimination, to be fair to Kling).

Kling's post isn't all wrong. He is mostly right about the labour market, which may be better characterised by a search model (for example, see here), than by a model that relies on wages being set equal to the value of the marginal product of labour. However, most economists already recognise the limitations of a neoclassical model of the labour market.

So, Kling is only right in terms of the labour market. By itself, that isn't enough to mean that economists should give up on marginalist thinking in business applications. At the margin, I think that Arnold Kling needs a refresher course on introductory economics.

[HT: Marginal Revolution]

*****

[*] Provocative to (neoclassical) economists, anyway. Most average people wouldn't care much, either way.

Wednesday, 16 August 2023

The Grocery Commissioner does not have a magic wand that will pass all GST savings onto food consumers

Regular readers of this blog, who also pay attention to the news, will have anticipated that I wasn't going to let this one slide. The Labour Party has announced that, if re-elected, it will remove GST from fresh and frozen food. As the New Zealand Herald reported earlier this week:

Hipkins and several ministers took to Lower Hutt yesterday to confirm Labour’s predicted election promise that it would remove GST from fresh and frozen fruit and vegetables from April next year if elected, putting $4-5 per week back into people’s pockets at an overall cost of $2 billion over four years.

When it comes to economic illiteracy in government, I don't think anything will every beat the stupidity around "it's not a tax, it's an excise". However, removing GST from food is close. Just read some of the expert comments in this New Zealand Herald article. Even the wildly pro-Labour CTU economist Craig Renney could only manage the lukewarm:

“It wouldn’t be my first choice if we were going to do this, but it’s definitely something that’s worth exploring”...

Worth exploring, then quietly forgetting all about the exploration, and disposing of the map you took to get there in a place where no one will ever find it. As I said a couple of weeks ago "this is a policy failure in waiting, if the government ever chose to implement it". I've covered similar points a few times (see here and here), so I'm not going to flog that dead horse again. Instead, I want to pick up on a comment from this New Zealand Herald article:

The 15 per cent tax would remain on items that had been processed, such as canned goods and juices. An expert group within Inland Revenue would be established to decide what products were exempt, and the Grocery Commissioner would be responsible for ensuring savings were passed on to consumers.

The Labour Party website says that (emphasis is theirs):

The Grocery Commissioner will monitor supermarkets, and report publicly to make sure that the actual cost benefits are passed on by supermarkets to New Zealanders. We will be tasking the newly established Grocery Commissioner with ensuring that supermarkets and other grocery outlets are not profiting from this policy change.

What the hell are "actual cost benefits"? Are they costs, or benefits? Let's be charitable and put that additional economic illiteracy aside, and assume that the Labour Party is trying to say that they want all of the cost savings from removing GST to be passed onto consumers. On the face of it, that seems like a reasonable expectation. Except that it will be impossible for the Grocery Commissioner to enforce.

To see why, consider the market for fresh food, as shown in the diagram below. If there is no GST, then the market would operate in equilibrium, with a price of P0 and a quantity of fresh food traded of Q0. However, GST, which is paid by the seller, effectively increases the sellers' costs. We represent this with a new curve, S+tax. GST is an ad valorem tax, which means that the amount of the tax is a proportion of the price of the good. So, the S+tax curve starts off close to the supply curve, and gets progressively further away as the price of the good increases. With GST in place, the price that consumers pay for food increases to PC. The producer receives that price from the consumer, and then passes the GST onto the government, leaving the producer with an effective price of PP (the difference between PC and PP is the amount of GST per unit sold). With the higher price including GST, the consumer demand less food (QT), and with the lower effective price after paying GST, the sellers supply less food (also QT). There is no excess supply or excess demand. Now, removing GST moves the market from a price of PC for consumers to the equilibrium price of P0 - consumers end up paying a lower price and buying more (Q0 instead of QT). However, the effective price for sellers increases from PP to P0 as well - producers end up receiving a higher price and selling more (Q0 instead of QT). Both consumers and producers benefit (in terms of price) from removing GST from food.

We can also look at this in terms of economic welfare. Consumer surplus is the difference between the amount that consumers are willing to pay (shown by the demand curve), and the amount they actually pay (the price). In the diagram, with GST in place, consumer surplus is the area ABPC. Producer surplus is the difference between the amount the sellers receive (the price), and their costs (shown by the supply curve). In the diagram, with GST in place, producer surplus is the area PPCF. The GST that is collected by the government, which is the per-unit amount of GST, multiplied by the quantity of food sold) is equal to the area PCBCPP. Total welfare is the sum of the three areas (consumer surplus, producer surplus, and government revenue), and is equal to the area ABCF.

When GST is removed, consumer surplus increases to the area AEP0, producer surplus increases to the area P0EF, and total welfare increases to the area AEF. Overall society gains total welfare equal to the area BEC, which was the deadweight loss of GST. [*] However, notice that both consumers and producers benefit (in terms of economic welfare) from removing GST from food. In an economists' view, eliminating the deadweight loss may be the only redeeming feature of this policy. [*]

But wait, you say! This is where the Grocery Commissioner steps in and says to the sellers: "You have to pass on the 'actual cost benefits' to the consumers". The Grocery Commissioner then waves their magic wand and the sellers lower the price for consumers all the way to PP, thereby ensuring that the whole difference between PC and PP is passed onto the consumer. That situation is also shown in the diagram above. At the price PP, the seller is willing to sell the quantity QT (just like before). However, consumers are wanting to buy QD food at this lower price. There is excess demand for food at the low price (there is a shortage). There isn't enough food available (QT) at the low price PP to satisfy all of the consumer demand for it (QD).

What happens to economic welfare? Producer surplus remains the area PPCF, just as before GST was removed. Consumer surplus increases to the area ABCPP, which is presumably higher than it would be at equilibrium, However, total welfare remains equal to the area ABCF, and the deadweight loss remains equal to the area BEC. In other words, in economic welfare terms, removing GST and forcing producers to continue to sell at the same effective (excluding GST) price would have the effect of transferring economic welfare from the government to consumers. Hooray for consumers.

However, then you have to think about which consumers will get that extra economic welfare. It's not all consumers. It's only consumers that buy fresh or frozen food. To be fair, that is probably most (if not all) consumers, but the bigger spenders (that is, higher income households) will benefit the most. If you really cared about low-income households, you could do a better job of helping low-income households by ringfencing the existing GST collected from fresh and frozen food, and using that money to increase social security benefits, family tax credits, or simply giving a transfer directly to all low-income households.

Now, let's go back to the Grocery Commissioner. It turns out that they don't have a magic wand that can keep the price at PP after GST is removed. The market will move back to equilibrium, and the benefits of removing GST from fresh and frozen food will be shared between consumers and sellers. It's not going to be possible to dictate that all of the tax savings are passed onto consumers, in the same way that it's not possible to dictate that a tax is only paid by one side of the market (for more on that point, see here).

So, unless the government is planning to replace Pierre van Heerden with Harry Potter, they're not going to ensure that all of the GST savings are passed onto consumers.

*****

[*] Although even removing the deadweight loss is not enough to fully redeem the policy, as noted in my other posts on this topic (see below), and in the criticisms of the experts.

Read more:

Sunday, 13 August 2023

McDonald's is price discriminating on its app, not price gouging

Once you know what to look for, you start to see price discrimination everywhere. Price discrimination is the practice of a firm offering different prices to different consumers for the same product, and where the different price doesn't depend on a difference in costs. A price-discriminating firm would want to charge a lower price to its more price-sensitive consumers, and a higher price to its less price-sensitive consumers.

One somewhat counter-intuitive example I use in my ECONS101 class is Delta Airlines charging higher prices to their frequent fliers (as noted in this Forbes article from 2015). The frequent fliers are less price sensitive (they have less elastic demand) because for them, there are few close substitutes for flying Delta Airlines. They have accumulated air miles on Delta, and they want to build up their balance. They don't get Delta air miles from other airlines, making them reluctant to switch to other airlines, even if the price is higher. Consumers who are not Delta frequent fliers are more price-sensitive (they have more elastic demand) because all other airlines are substitutes for Delta on the same route.

It seems that Delta Airlines is not alone in this counter-intuitive approach, as the New Zealand Herald reported earlier this week:

Users of McDonald’s popular mobile app have raised fears that frequent customers are being hit with higher prices than others, a practice they claim is “price gouging”.

The claims were raised on Reddit, where one user highlighted that he was being charged up to $3 more than his partner for some items, despite them both accessing the app on the same day, from the same location.

The only difference between their accounts? He had more than double the number of loyalty points, showing he had used the app more in the past.

To be clear, this isn't 'price gouging', it is price discrimination, pure and simple. McDonald's justified its actions as follows:

The Herald approached McDonald’s NZ for comment on the claims and a spokesperson said the differences might be due to lower prices being used entice customers to return to the app.

Noting that personalised deals had been in place since the loyalty programme was rolled out last year, the spokesperson said details of how benefits were offered and data was used is spelled out in the terms and conditions.

“Individual offers will differ between users, based on a variety of factors,” they told the Herald.

“Due to the personalisation of our app, not all customers will see the same deals, and as an example a deal may be offered to encourage use of the app on the customer’s next visit.”

Just like Delta Airlines' frequent fliers, frequent users of the McDonald's app are less price-sensitive. That might be because they want to build up points on the app (just like air miles), or it might simply be that McDonald's has found that the most loyal McDonald's users are less sensitive to price, and more likely to use the app. In both cases, for these consumers there are fewer close substitutes to McDonald's than there are for infrequent app users, and so the frequent users' demand is less elastic than the infrequent app users. McDonald's therefore offers lower prices to infrequent users of the app, because they are more price sensitive.

Despite any complaints that users of the app may have, none of this is illegal. Firms are free to offer different prices to different consumers. As noted in the article:

The Herald approached Consumer NZ about the claims of price gouging and the watchdog said it had not received any complaints about pricing on the app.

“The Fair Trading Act states businesses can’t mislead shoppers about prices, and the Privacy Act requires companies to disclose to consumers what data is being collected and how it’s being used,” a Consumer NZ spokesperson said.

“If McDonald’s is using personalised pricing, or their customers’ data to set different prices based on factors like what products they’ve searched for in the past, or their location – they should be upfront about it,” they added, pointing towards a Consumer guide to personalised pricing.

“While personalised pricing may not be inherently bad, it relies on businesses applying it fairly, responsibly, and transparently.”

Personalised pricing is a particular form of price discrimination (first-degree price discrimination), where every consumer may be charged a different price for the good or service (for more on this, see this post). If executed perfectly, the firm would charge a price equal to the maximum the consumer is willing to pay. Fortunately (for consumers, not for firms), personalised pricing is mostly a theoretical curiosity. However, the more data that firms have about consumers, the closer they can get to estimating their consumers' willingness-to-pay.

Apps like the McDonald's app are a very handy tool for firms to collect information about their consumers, what they are willing to pay for different goods and services (and what they are not willing to pay). That data can then be used to set prices in the future. It's a point that I've made before. Give it time - if consumers keep giving firms their data, pretty soon we'll all face personalised prices for most of the things that we buy.

[HT: Max from my ECONS101 class]

Saturday, 12 August 2023

Meta and basic research as a public good

Earlier this week, Meta disbanded a research team that had been working on using artificial intelligence to create a database of protein structures. As the Financial Times reported (paywalled):

Meta has axed a team that used artificial intelligence to create the first database of more than 600mn protein structures, in a signal the company is abandoning purely scientific projects in favour of building moneymaking AI products.

The social media giant had employed a group of about a dozen scientists on a project called ESMFold, which trained a large language model capable of processing vast amounts of biological data to predict protein structures. The effort has been lauded by those involved in the development of new drugs and treatments...

Though the protein-folding team was small compared with the thousands of AI scientists and engineers still employed at Meta, the move to axe their project showed the company’s desire to abandon blue-sky research in favour of AI projects that can generate revenues, the people familiar with the matter added.

The problem here is one of public goods. Public goods are goods that are non-rival (non-rival means that one person consuming the good does not reduce the amount of the good or service available for everyone else), and non-excludable (non-excludable means that if they are available for anyone, then they are available for everyone). Examples of public goods include streetlights, policing, and basic research.

The ESMFold team were created a database of predicted protein structures that could then be used by other researchers. A database like that is non-rival (one researcher using it doesn't prevent it being used by other researchers). Is it excludable? It need not be, but because Meta was releasing the database for researchers to use for free (it is available here), they made it non-excludable. As a non-rival and non-excludable good, the database is a public good.

The problem with public goods is free riders - some researchers may use the database, and might have been willing to pay for it, but many would use it without paying (and Meta wasn't asking for payment in any case). That makes the costs of providing the database difficult to justify for a firm that is profit-maximising. It is not a sustainable position (as evidenced by Meta shutting the team down), which is why public goods are usually provided by the government (either directly, or through procurement from a private provider).

Meta is redirecting the resources the ESMFold team was previously using into other AI applications, which are also non-rival but are excludable. These are club goods, which Meta can charge subscribers for access to. That they would redirect the resources in this manner does raise a question though - why didn't they simply make ESMFold pay-for-access (that is, excludable)? There was no need for it to be treated as a public good and shut down. Although perhaps, having already released earlier versions of ESMFold for free access, many researchers may have already downloaded a copy of the database, so making it excludable would simply drive those researchers to use their own free version instead? That suggests that Meta believes the benefits (in terms of subscriber revenue) are exceeded by the costs of continuing to fund the ESMFold team.

Another related question is why Meta released ESMFold as open access in the first place. This makes more sense than it appears at first. The database user community probably gave a lot of feedback to the ESMFold team, which was not only useful in improving the AI capability within that team, but had more general use as well. With an excludable database, the user community, and the quantity and quality of feedback received from the community, would likely be much smaller. Now, with AI development much more advanced, perhaps the value of the feedback received from the ESMFold user community has decreased to an extent that the benefits of retaining the open access database are exceeded by the costs.

Basic research is a public good. Even when a private firm like Meta initially provided access to a public good for free, we should not be surprised when the public good eventually becomes unavailable. A private firm will only provide goods (including public goods) for as long as the benefits exceed the costs.

Wednesday, 9 August 2023

The income and substitution effects of a tax cut

Benjamin Franklin once famously wrote that "in this world nothing can be said to be certain, except death and taxes". Taxes may be certain, but the tax rate is not. Tax rates vary widely across the world, and have varied widely over time for each country. Economists are concerned about tax rates because, among other things, they affect the incentives to work.

However, it isn't just any tax rate that affects work incentives. We need to take into account all of the changes that affect a worker's income, as a result of working more. Working more results in more income tax payable, but might also reduce a worker's entitlement to government transfers (social security benefits, student allowances), or reduce their entitlement to subsidies (for example, subsidised housing or healthcare) or rebates (for example childcare rebates). All of those changes need to be taken into account.

The effective marginal tax rate (EMTR) is the amount of the next dollar of earnings that a person loses to taxes, to decreases in entitlements to government transfers, and to decreases in subsidies and rebates. It is the EMTR that best captures the incentive effects of the tax and transfer system. When a worker faces a high EMTR, there is a disincentive to work more. When the EMTR is lower, there is more incentive to work.

To see why, consider what happens if the EMTR decreases. For example, if the government offers an income tax cut, this will decrease the EMTR. The after-tax-and-transfers reward for working increases, making work more attractive. The opportunity cost of leisure time (measured as the after-tax-and-transfers wage) increases, making leisure time less attractive. The worker decides to work more. This is an example of the substitution effect. The relative price of working compared with leisure has increased, encouraging a shift to more work and less leisure.

However, there is also an income effect. The higher wage increases the worker's income, and they use that income to consume more normal goods. Leisure time is a normal good, so the worker wants to consume more of it (and work less). Notice that the income effect works in the opposite direction to the substitution effect here. They offset each other.

This leads to an interesting implication of a tax cut. For some workers, especially those on low wages, the substitution effect (work more) is larger than the income effect (work less). In general, a tax cut encourages those on low wages to work more. However, for other workers, especially those on high wages, the substitution effect (work more) is smaller than the income effect (work less). In general, a tax cut encourages those on high wages to work less. Why might the high wage workers work less? Those workers may realise that they can continue to earn the same amount as before, while working fewer hours. This allows them to continue to spend the same amount as before, and have more leisure at the same time. In fact, some workers may be able to both earn and spend more, and have more leisure time.

The income and substitution effects of a tax cut do not necessarily lead all workers to work more. Some workers will respond by working less. In fact, if we look at work and leisure time over the long run (as in this post), we see workers both earning more income, and spending more time on leisure (and working fewer hours). Changes in tax rates change the incentive to work, but they don't necessarily affect all workers in the same way.

Read more:

Tuesday, 8 August 2023

Carbon taxes are not a costless way to boost the economy

Economists recognise that any choice we make comes with an opportunity cost - for every thing that we choose to do, we are giving up the opportunity of doing something else. This is memorably captured in the acronym TANSTAAFL - There Ain't No Such Thing As A Free Lunch. So, I was interested to read  this article in The Conversation last week, by Mona Mashhadi Rajabi (University of Technology Sydney), about carbon taxes:

A new study has found that a carbon tax, accompanied by “revenue recycling”, can produce both environmental and economic benefits for Australia.

Revenue recycling means money reaped from a carbon tax would be redirected back into the economy. This means the money accumulated from the tax would be redistributed between different stakeholders in the economy without increasing the government’s revenue.

To be more specific, the tax income should be used to support consumption, invest in new research and development projects, and subsidise energy saving and pollution reducing programs. Using this approach makes the tax more politically appealing to companies and other opponents.

So far, so good. But this bit is more than a little surprising:

My study recommends that in the first year, all the tax revenue would be used to support consumption. However, the amount of money allotted to investment would rise from the second year as the carbon tax rate increases. It is estimated that about $57 billion would be available for new technologies over 13 years under this carbon tax.

Imposing a carbon tax would also provide a financial incentive for industry to reduce its fossil fuel use. It would motivate the sector to shift to low-carbon technologies as they would bear a smaller tax bill and reap larger profits.

My study concludes Australia could reduce carbon emissions by 35% while GDP would increase by 0.286% by 2035 and new jobs would be created in research and development. Following the recommended carbon tax design, Australia’s transition to a low-carbon economy would be accelerated, which would benefit both the economy and the environment.

This appears to describe a policy choice with no trade-off. That is, there is no opportunity cost. If the government can tax carbon, pump that money back into the economy to support consumption, and increase consumption and output (GDP), then someone ought to be shouting this from the rooftops. Rajabi is describing a route to infinite consumption. Because, having increased consumption and GDP, the government can then raise taxes again, increasing consumption and GDP by more, and then raise taxes again, increasing consumption and GDP by even more. Repeat this process over and over again, all the way to infinite GDP. Of course, that makes no sense.

To see why, let's consider what happens when you tax a product, and give all of the tax revenue back to consumers as additional income. We'll start with the basic consumer choice model (or the constrained optimisation model of the consumer), as shown in the diagram below. We are using some made up numbers, but the example works the same with other combinations of numbers. The diagram shows the budget constraint for a consumer with income of $1000, choosing between buying carbon goods (with a price of $1), or all other goods (AOG, also with a price of $1). The consumer can choose to consume anywhere on their budget constraint or below it (this is the feasible set). The budget constraint runs from a bundle of goods with no carbon goods at all, and the consumer spending all of their income to buy 1000 AOG, to a bundle of goods with no AOG at all, and the consumer spending all of their income to buy 1000 carbon goods. The slope of the budget constraint is equal to the relative price of the goods (the price of carbon goods, divided by the price of AOG), which is equal to 1 ($1/$1). The consumer is trying to get to the highest possible indifference curve, which is the indifference curve I0 (for more on indifference curves, read this post). They buy the bundle of goods E0, which contains 500 of AOG (costing $500) and 500 carbon goods (costing $500).

Now consider what happens when carbon goods are taxed. Let's assume that the tax is so high that it doubles the price of carbon goods [*]. The effect of this change is shown in the diagram below. The consumer's budget constraint pivots inwards to the red line, and becomes steeper. The slope of the budget constraint is now equal to 2, which is the new relative price of the goods (the price of carbon goods, divided by the price of AOG, which is now $2/$1). If the consumer were only buying AOG (and no carbon goods), they could still buy 1000 AOG. However, if they were only buying carbon goods (and no AOG), they could now only buy 500 AOG. The consumer can no longer afford the bundle E0 - it is outside the feasible set (outside the budget constraint). Instead, the consumer will consume the bundle of goods on the highest indifference curve that they can reach on the new budget constraint. That is the bundle E2, which is on the indifference curve I2, and contains 600 of AOG (costing $600), and 200 carbon goods (costing $400). Notice that the consumer is still spending all of their income, but they have been made much worse off (they are now on a lower indifference curve, meaning that they get less utility from their consumption).

Now let's see what happens if we recycle the tax revenue back to the consumer. The budget constraint remains steep (because the relative price of carbon goods and AOG is still equal to 2), but moves outwards parallel to the previous budget constraint. It doesn't move out all the way to E0 though. At E2, the consumer was paying $200 in carbon tax, so their income goes up by $200, to $1200. The new budget constraint, shown in blue, extends from the point where they spend all $1200 on AOG, buying 1200 AOG, to the point where they spend all $1200 on carbon goods, buying 600 carbon goods. The consumer can now do better than the bundle of goods E2, and reach a higher indifference curve I1, by buying the bundle of goods E1. That bundle contains 700 AOG (costing $700), and 250 carbon goods (costing $500). However, notice that even after the tax revenue has been recycled to them, the consumer is not as well off as they were before the tax was introduced. They may be spending more ($1200 instead of $1000), but their utility is lower.

This demonstrates that there is a cost to this policy. The consumer pays it in the form of lower utility. To be fair, in a sense Rajabi is correct. The consumer is now spending more than before ($1200 instead of $1000), so consumption has increased. But that is an increase in nominal terms. The price of carbon goods has gone up. If we think about the value of the goods that the consumer is buying, at the original (non-taxed) prices, they are only buying $950 worth of goods now (700 AOG worth $700 and 250 carbon goods worth $250), compared with $1000 before the tax was introduced. Or if we think about the value of the goods that the consumer was buying before the tax was introduced, but valued at the new prices, they were previously buying $1500 worth of goods (500 AOG worth $500 and 500 carbon goods worth $1000), but now they are buying $1200 worth. Either way, they are now buying a total bundle of goods that is worth less - the consumer's real income has decreased.

Of course, most people who advocate for 'revenue recycling' are not arguing that every taxpayer would receive back exactly what they paid in the tax. Many prefer that the 'carbon dividend' would be paid only to low income households. That would change the analysis somewhat. First, there would be high-income households for which the analysis looks much like the second diagram - a carbon tax with no offsetting dividend. These households would be unambiguously worse off with the tax. Second, there would be low-income households for which the analysis looks like the third diagram, but with the increase in income from the revenue recycling being much larger. In theory, these low-income households would be better off as a result of the carbon dividend. In other words, the tax would redistribute income from high-income taxpayers to low-income taxpayers. However, it still wouldn't increase the real value of consumption or GDP overall. It would simply redistribute who is doing the consumption spending.

Overall, we can conclude that it isn't possible to simply pump up the economy endlessly by taxing carbon goods and recycling the tax revenue to consumers as additional income. Any analysis that shows this is possible is clearly missing something important. There ain't no such thing as a free lunch.

*****

[*] In reality, this would require a tax of more than 100 percent, because a tax raises the price that consumers pay, but producers share the burden of the tax, so the whole tax amount is not passed onto consumers as a higher price. For more on this, see this post. However, for simplicity we will assume that the entire tax is passed onto the consumer in the form of a higher price. This assumption would affect the exact numbers from the example, but not the overall conclusion.

Sunday, 6 August 2023

Book review: From Here to Economy

I enjoyed Todd Buchholtz's book New Ideas from Dead Economists (which I reviewed here a couple of years ago), so I was looking forward to reading his 1995 book From Here to Economy. The subtitle promises that it is "a shortcut to economic literacy", and it mostly delivers. However, the problem with books based on a collection of contemporary economic and policy issues is that they don't necessarily age well. And sadly, that is the case for this book. The underlying economics is fine, but a reader in the 2020s is not necessarily going to get as much out of the examples as a reader in the 1990s would have.

That said, Buchholtz is clearly a fan of small government, and the book presents that as a position that most economists agree with (which it isn't, and wasn't even in the 1990s). This shines through in his selections at the end of the book of the five greatest economists of all time. Buchholtz nominates Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Alfred Marshall, John Maynard Keynes, and Milton Friedman. I have no argument with the first four, but Friedman would be way down my list, behind at least Paul Samuelson, Arthur Pigou, Gary Becker, Ronald Coase, and Kenneth Arrow (not necessarily in that order).

The other thing that marks an older book is the predictions it makes. Buchholtz does fairly well on this score. He is skeptical that there would be agreement on adopting the Euro until the 21st Century (the Euro was adopted in 1999), and he predicts Nobel Prizes for Amartya Sen (who won in 1998) and (who won in 1995, as the book was being finalised). His third predicted Nobel winner, Martin Feldstein, never won but probably deserved to.

Putting aside its datedness, the book is a lot of fun. Buchholtz can be hilarious, as these excerpts show:

If virgin wool sweaters go out of style because they itch too much, their prices would fall, so that both manufacturers and sheep get the message: stop making so much.

Perhaps sheep are utility maximisers? And on the Efficient Markets Hypothesis:

You would probably do just as well choosing a stock by throwing a stockbroker at a dartboard as listening to his advice - and you would save money.

And on the safety of mutual funds:

The word mutual certainly does not by itself mean that the fund is especially safe. Think of the Titanic as a mutual vacation.

Having started by explaining some basic macroeconomics and microeconomics, the book then moves to personal finance, which is a different approach to that taken in most pop economics books. And the end of the book is devoted to economic history, which recalls Buchholtz's earlier book. The personal finance section remains useful, although the examples are obviously dated. The economic history is, as I noted in my review of New Ideas from Dead Economists, very welcome.

Overall, I enjoyed the book, but for current readers, there are others that I would recommend before it. This is not because of the quality of the writing and explanations, but only that the datedness of the examples limits their usefulness.

Saturday, 5 August 2023

The deadweight loss of free beer

My excellent (and sports-mad) colleague Shaen Corbet shared with me a story about the Nebraska-Northwestern college football game played in Ireland last year. As reported in the Irish Mirror:

But what couldn't be predicted was the events in the Aviva Stadium on Saturday night as technical glitches saw thousands upon thousands take advantage of free food, drink and alcohol.

There was always going to be a party atmosphere for the first Aer Lingus College Football Classic since 2019, a momentous occasion to remind us just how lucky we are to have these events back.

But the Aviva Stadium was rocking like a Harry Styles gig from just a few weeks prior as queues went a dozen deep as match attendees fleeced the concession stand and bar in a one time only offer of everything being free.

A Twitter (ok, X, but it was Twitter then) user posted this video of the queues for beer, where you can see that the entire foyer area in front of the bar is jam-packed with spectators looking for free beer. Usually, if the price is reduced to zero, we would expect to see a shortage. That's because the sellers would want to sell less (because it is less profitable) at the same time that the buyers are wanting to buy more.

However, in this case, the government chose to subsidise the beer (Shaen tells me it was to reduce the chance of unruly fans getting out of control). We can see the effect of this subsidy, reducing the price to zero, using a supply and demand model as shown below. If the beer market was operating in equilibrium, the price would have been P0, and the quantity of beer traded Q0. Instead, the government paid a subsidy to the beer sellers. We demonstrate this on the diagram with a new curve, S-subsidy, which is below the supply curve S by the amount of the subsidy (which was exactly enough to lower the price from P0 to zero). The effective price for the beer sellers increases to PP, which is the zero price they receive from the spectators, plus the per-unit amount of the subsidy. The quantity of beer demanded increases to Q1, and so does the quantity of beer supplied. There is no shortage of beer.

It is worth considering the impacts on economic welfare of this subsidy though. Consumer surplus is the difference between the amount that consumers are willing to pay (shown by the demand curve), and the amount they actually pay (the price). In the diagram, at the equilibrium price and quantity, consumer surplus is the triangle AEP0. Producer surplus is the difference between the amount the sellers receive (the price), and their costs (shown by the supply curve). In the diagram, at the equilibrium price and quantity, producer surplus is the triangle P0EB. Total welfare is the sum of the two areas (consumer surplus and producer surplus), and is equal to the triangle AEB.

Once the subsidy is introduced, the consumer surplus increases to AQ1O, while the producer surplus increases to the area BCQ1O. The government loses the area of subsidy, which is the rectangle PPCQ1O (this rectangle is the per-unit amount of the subsidy, multiplied by the quantity of subsidised beer). Total welfare is the sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus, minus the subsidy (the subsidy is subtracted because it has an opportunity cost of lower government spending in other areas), and is equal to the area AEB-ECQ1 [*]. In other words, total welfare is lower by ECQ1 as a result of the subsidy. This is the deadweight loss of the subsidy.

To add insult to injury, even though the price of beer may have been zero, the cost of beer was not free. That's because you have to factor in the cost of the time spent waiting to be served (which will be much higher when the queues are longer), as well as the loss of enjoyment of missing part of the game while waiting for beer. Plus, there are external costs of over-drinking imposed on other fans. Shaen, who was at the game, tells me that there were spectators who vomited all over other spectators after over-indulging in 'free' beer. So, free beer wasn't necessarily a good deal for everyone, least of all for Irish taxpayers and for those who needed a dry-cleaner (and possibly a counselling session) after the game.

[HT: Shaen Corbet]

*****

[*] The overlapping areas of consumer surplus, producer surplus, and subsidy make this tricky to see. However, there is a shortcut. The area of total welfare is the area that is in-between marginal social benefit (MSB) and marginal social cost (MSC) out to the quantity that is traded (in this case, Q1). When MSB is greater than MSC, this represents positive welfare (the area AEB). But when MSB is less than MSC, this represents negative welfare (the area BCQ1).