In my review of Branko Milanovic's book Capitalism, Alone yesterday, I noted that there were a couple of missed opportunities for the book to go deeper on certain topics. One of those was a simple model of migration flows and migrants' rights, presented in Chapter 4 of the book. Milanovic motivates this model with a discussion of the native-born population's view on migrants, based on the following proposition (emphasis is from the book):
...The native population is more likely to accept migrants the less likely the migrants are to permanently remain in the country and use all the benefits of citizenship.
This proposition introduces a negative relationship between (i) willingness to accept migrants and (ii) extension of migrants' rights...
Milanovic then goes on to illustrate this relationship with a simple diagram, noting that:
...it seems reasonable to believe that there is a kind of demand curve for migrants, where the demand is less when the cost of migrants, in terms of the rights and sharing of the citizenship premium they can claim, is greater.
This 'demand curve' relationship that Milanovic describes is shown in the diagram below (by the line D). Milanovic distinguishes between two cases, represented by two points on the demand curve in the diagram: (1) high on the curve (at point A), where migrants have extensive rights, but the native-born population would desire very few migrants; and (2) low on the curve (at point B), where migrants have few rights, and the native-born population are willing to accept more migrants.
However, here is where Milanovic misses an opportunity. Yes, there may be such a demand curve for migrant flows. However, there is also a corresponding supply curve, constructed from the decisions of the potential migrants themselves. Ceteris paribus (holding all else constant), migrants would desire to go to destinations where they would have greater citizenship rights. In other words, the supply of migrants in this model is upward sloping, as shown in the diagram below (by the line S).
Now consider Milanovic's two cases. The first case, where migrants are offered extensive rights, is illustrated in the diagram below. Consider migrant rights of R1. The native-born population desires very few migrants (MD1), but the number of migrants who want to migrate to such an attractive destination is high (MS1). There will be conflict. There is an excess supply of migrants (the difference between MD1 and MS1). The native-born population feels like they are being overwhelmed by migrants who are taking advantage of the rights of citizenship that they have not 'earned'. The native-born population agitates, and the government relents, eventually by offering fewer citizenship rights to migrants. This continues until rights reach R0. This is the equilibrium amount of citizenship rights. The equilibrium migration flow is M0.
Now consider Milanovic's second case, where migrants are offered few rights, which is illustrated in the diagram below. Consider migrant rights of R2. The native-born population is willing to accept many migrants (MD2), but the number of migrants who want to migrate to such an unattractive destination is low (MS2). There will be few migrants, and the economy may suffer as a result. There is an excess demand for migrants (the difference between MS2 and MD2). The government wants to attract more migrants, so they begin to offer migrants more rights. This continues until rights reach R0. This is the equilibrium amount of citizenship rights. The equilibrium migration flow is again M0.
Having established equilibrium migrant rights and migration flows, we can now use the model in much the same way as the standard model of demand and supply. Consider some exercises in comparative statics (the movement from one equilibrium to another). If there is an exogenous increase in the supply of migrants, such that more migrants are willing to migrate at each and every level of rights, then the supply curve shifts to the right. The equilibrium level of migrant rights will fall. If populist rhetoric reduces the willingness of the native-born population to accept migrants, then the demand curve shifts to the left. The equilibrium level of migrant rights will fall. And so on.
Obviously, the model is not a perfect description of the relationship between migrant rights and migration flows. However, Milanovic could easily have built up this model (as I have done above) and used it more extensively to explore the relationship here. By ignoring the role that migrants' choices play (the supply curve in the model above), Milanovic suggests that only the demand curve matters. That is, that only the choices of the native-born population will affect migration. Clearly, that is an incomplete description. The level of citizenship rights that migrants receive will depend on government actions, and the forces (upward or downward) that impact those actions depend on both the native-born population and the migrants.
Even this post has, I think, barely scratched the surface of the utility of a model like this, to understand the politics of migration flows and migrants' rights. I'm sure that there is much more that can be done with this.
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