Last year, the Government released a green paper entitled Te Ara Paerangi - Future Pathways, which set off a process of consultation on the future of New Zealand’s research system, including research priorities, funding, institutions, workforce, infrastructure, and Māori research. You can read Universities New Zealand's submission on the green paper here. I don't have too much to say on it, but it did prompt me to look back at a report that has been sitting on my (virtual) to-be-read pile for some time. That's this report by David Preston, written just as Superu (the relatively short-lived Social Policy Evaluation and Research Unit, which succeeded the Families Commission) was being disestablished.
Social science research has always been the poor sibling in research priority and funding in New Zealand, in comparison with physical and biological sciences, and medical research. There are some ironies to that, which I'll return to later in this post. Preston's report catalogues the failures (and modest successes) of publicly funded social science research institutions in New Zealand. In particular, he notes the demise of the New Zealand Planning Council (1977-1991), the Commission for the Future (1977-1982), the Social Sciences Research Fund Committee (1979-1990), the New Zealand Institute for Social Research and Development (1992-1995), and finally Superu (2014-2017, previously the Families Commission from 2004-2014). The short-lived BRCSS (Building Research Capacity in the Social Sciences) initiative (2004-2010), which I was on the steering group of as it wound down and became eSocSci, also rates a mention. The only two successes that Preston notes are the New Zealand Council for Education Research (NZCER) and the Health Research Council (HRC), both of which were set up in the 1930s are persist to this day.
Based on a study of documentary evidence from annual reports and other sources, as well as interviews with key informants, Preston identifies a number of factors that are associated with the success or failure of these institutions for social science research. In terms of the successful institutions:
Some of the factors which are present in successful social research bodies are those which are common to all successful professional organisations. These include competent professional staff, good management, and adequate resourcing and critical mass for the size of the task they faced. All Long Life institutions, however, also display four other characteristics:
1. a clearly defined field of research
2. well identified research priorities
3. a stable long term funding model, at least for base line funding
4. effective relations with the departmental policy and social service delivery agencies.
And in terms of the unsuccessful institutions:
For government departmental social research units which diminished or vanished in the course of public sector restructuring, no common factor other than the restructuring itself has been identified. They were located in ’less core’ parts of the public sector. Apart from this, no particular pattern is evident.
For social research and advisory bodies outside of main departments, the factors associated with a short existence are one or more of the following:
1. attempting to cover too many different areas of social research
2. not providing the type of information and advice wanted by the government of the day, or providing information or advice at odds with their policy direction
3. lack of an adequate long term base funding arrangement.
Probably the key thing that stands out from this report (aside from the fact that it is clearly a parting shot from Superu, which funded the report), is the highly political nature of social science funding. For example, Preston notes the problems associated with multi-sector research institutions that sit outside of core government services:
While this position outside of government proper gives the institution more independence, it also makes the entity more vulnerable to unfavourable reactions from the government of the day. This is especially so if it is providing advice or information on politically sensitive issues. The government cannot do without its core government departments, but it can do without particular advisory bodies or research institutions.
A related example is the closure of the Social Policy Journal of New Zealand, which had been set up and run by the Social Policy Agency, part of the Department of Social Welfare:
No official reason was ever given for the closure of the Journal. However, informal sources commented that an article about to be published included information which indicated that a statement made by a Minister was inaccurate. Publication of the issue was delayed until public interest in the topic died down and it was decided to cease publication of the Journal, apparently to avoid future difficulties with Ministers.
The development indicates the difficulties of maintaining the ability to publish research findings within a politically sensitive environment in a government department.
All of this suggests that social science research institutions are always in a precarious position, reliant on short-term funding sources and beholden to the political whims of government. Preston summarises the various reviews of social science research that have been undertaken since the 1970s (of which there have been many). One common theme across those reviews is the need for a social science research institution with a sufficient level of baseline funding to maintain core research activity. Preston uses the example of the Brookings Institution from the U.S., which admittedly is not funded by the government, but has had a lasting impact on policy development and is generally well respected.
New Zealand needs quality social science research capacity. At present, there is some capacity in various research units in government, including the Social Welfare Agency (previously the Social Investment Agency), Ministry of Social Development, and elsewhere. However, the main capacity lies in academic institutions and in the private sector, both of which have incentives that do not necessarily lead to good policy-relevant research. In the case of academics, the incentives are to publish in high quality international journals, which tend not to be interested in policy-focused New Zealand research. In the case of the private sector, their incentive is to cater to the needs of paying clients, such as market research and economic research.
The irony is that the government is increasingly focusing research funding and infrastructure on physical and biological sciences, agriculture, and engineering (broadly defined). There is a clear focus on research that provides economic returns. It might seem odd for an economist to argue that we need to refocus resources in a different direction than that, but there are important societal challenges where the natural sciences and engineering are of limited assistance. Improving social wellbeing, and better understanding the impacts of inequality, can't be achieved by ignoring the important contributions of social science. Climate change research also can't ignore social science, because ultimately it is the behaviour of people that will determine the success or otherwise of climate change initiatives. Engineers and natural scientists often have a 'build it and they will come' mindset to the solutions they design, which ignores the complex motivations that real people have.
If New Zealand truly has a goal of improving wellbeing for all New Zealanders, then social science research has an important role to play, and needs appropriate funding and infrastructure to support that role. This is the one thing that most needs to be picked up in the consultation on the government's green paper.
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